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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LETHEA R. FREDRICKSON, ,. 
Plai11tiff and Respondent, 
\'S. 
DR. R. B. :JIA \V and DR. FLOYD F. \ 
HATCH, DR. L. E. VIKO, DR. J. 
RUSSELL \VHERRITT, DR. R. B. I 
R. B. :JIA \Y, DR. T. C. BAUER-
LEIX, and DR. Y. A. CHRISTEN-
SEX, doing business under the firm 
name and style of INTEMOUN-
TAIX CLINIC, a co-partnership, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
7452 
Brief of Respondent 
Appellants have, in their statement accentuated 
points which they feel should have influenced the court 
and jury but did not do so, and have skimmed over or 
neglected to state evidence which was material to plain-
tiff's case and which was believed by the jury. 
This is a law case and the questions raised by the 
appeal are as to whether there was any substantial 
evidence to go to the Jury; whether the court erred 
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in its instruction on the measure of damages; and in 
ruling on one question relating to the right of cros~­
examination. The instructions of the court with refer-
ence to determining the issues of duty, violation of 
duty and negligence are not in question. Defendant 
concedes them to correctly state the law of this case. 
In ruling on a motion for non-suit or directed 
verdict the evidence is considered in the most favor-
able light to plaintiff's case. After verdict and judg-
ment the facts ~are presumed to be as claimed by plain-
tiff. All conflicts are resolved in favor of the verdict 
unless the plaintiff failed to make a case. This court 
is, therefore, not interested in determining the weight 
of the evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence is the 
question. 
Let us therefore take a look at the evidence as 
it stood at the end of plaintiff's case; and again as 
it stood at the end of the trial, bearing in mind that 
all conflicts are resolved in favor of plaintiff by the 
verdict of the jury and, for the purpose of considering 
such motions, by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(a) At the conclusion of plaintiff's case. 
(b) At the conclusion of the case. 
(a) 
Mrs. Fredrickson testified that prior to the 6th 
day of July, 1945, she was in good health excepting 
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1.-· 
that one of her knees was stiff. She had never had 
any trouble with her throat or sinuses (R. 81). She 
had consulted Dr. Boucher of .Murray about her knee. 
She went to the Intermountain Clinic by 1appointment 
on that date to see about her knee. She had a physical 
examination and was directed to Dr. Maw. l-Ie rec-
ommended the removal of her tonsils. He said there 
was nothing wrong but there was pus in the right 
tonsil. Dr. Tyndale then told her it might help her 
arthritis ( R. 83). She decided to have her tonsils out, 
received an appointment with Dr .. Maw, and reported 
on July 17, 1945 for the operation. They put her in 
bed, it was dark, and the doctor had a light (R. 85). 
He gave her a local anesthetic and proceeded to take 
out her tonsils. He used cotton and ~auze. The opera-
tion took about an hour (R. 86); she was told to return 
in about three weeks for a check-up (R. 87). During 
that time her throat was sore, she couldn't swallow 
anything. She returned as directed; Dr. Maw was on 
vacation; she saw the nurse who looked at her throat, 
said it was all right. She told the nurse she was having 
difficulty in swallowing, and "it feels like there is a 
lump in n1y throat" (R. 88). She was not told to come 
back. She paid the bill for the operation (R. 89). A 
week or ten days ~after that her throat was terrific, 
always sore, so she called on the phone and asked for 
Dr. Maw, was told that he was busy, was asked what 
she wanted, and told the nurse her throat was sore 
and wanted to know what to do. She heard the nurse 
tH tell Dr. :Maw that it was Mrs. Fredrickson and that ~e ~ 
~ she had an ulcer in her throat. She was told to como 
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1n (R. 90), which she did. Dr. Maw looked at her 
throat, washed out her nose, said there was some 
drainage from her tonsil area and head, and prescribed 
a mouth wash. He didn't tell her to come back (R. 91). 
About every three weeks or every month after that 
she went to see Dr. Maw for about a year and a half 
(R. 92). She was in distress and he just gave her 
sinus treatments. All of this time her throat was sore. 
She went to the Clinic last on June 29, 1948. During 
this time she also went to see Dr. Boucher, her family 
doctor (R. 93), because her throat was sore, 'and Dr. 
Maw wasn't doing her any good. He prescribed peni-
cillin. She also went to see her dentist, Dr. Wright. 
He examined her mouth but did nothing. He referred 
her to a physician, Dr. Johnson. He examined her 
mouth and prescribed suHa and penicillin (R. 95). She 
then had Dr. \Vright take out eighteen front teeth (R. 
96). This was in January 1946. He did not take out 
any rear teeth. They had been taken out years ago. 
Dr. Wright did not use any packs in her mouth. He 
did not use any absorbent cotten in her mouth (R. 97). 
He did not pl'ace any fabric materials of any kind in 
her mouth. He did no work in the rear of her mouth 
(R. 98). She then went back to Dr. Boucher because 
her throat was sore and there was an ulcer right in the 
hole of the tonsil (R. 99). Dr. Wright gave her some 
dentures but they hurt her terribly. Every place in 
her mouth there were sores and everything. He sent 
her back to Dr. Boucher for penicillin. Dr. Boucher 
sent her to Dr. Moorehead. At that time the ulcer was 
clearing up so he examined for sinus. Dr. Wright 
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~ made another set of dentures but they couldn't be 
- used (R. 100). The gun1s wouldn't heal. She went 
~ back to Dr. Moorehead but he did nothing for her . 
. ~ She then went to Dr. Browning· (R. 101) to see if he 
·~ could find out what was the matter. Her mouth was 
l::_ more or less sore all the time. Sometimes it would 
~~ heal up and then another ulcer would break out. There 
i~ was no tin1e when she wasn't in pain. Up to this time 
]Qrl the only doctor or dentist who did any work in her 
flj mouth was Dr. \Yright. She went to Dr. Browning 
rrai' in July 1947. 
.,-
OOL.'.I 
i!al~; 
R1it 
~· 
~~ 
Wri~ 
Dr. Browning took x-rays (R. 102), after which 
he opened up the gums just a little bit to the left of 
center and cleaned out the infection and three days 
later made the correction. He did not use any packs, 
gauze, or cotton in her mouth (R. 103), nor did he 
do any surgery in the rear of her mouth, or in the 
throat or on the palate or around the tonsil area. Dr. 
Sears was also there. Dr. Browning removed the 
dentures. They hurt. A couple of weeks afterwards 
ulcers began to show up again. Her mouth was sore. 
In October 1947 she went back to Dr. Wright. Her 
mouth and throat were in terrible condition. There were 
ulcers on sides, down in the throat, in the tonsil area 
and along side of her tongue (R. 104). 
She then saw Dr. Argyle, a ·physician In Murray. 
He prescribed penicillin (R. 105). She then went back 
to Dr. Browning; he did nothing. She went to Dr. 
Maw again the same day that she saw Dr. Browning. 
There was an ulcer on her tongue; Dr. Hatch was 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
also there. He took a sample for a test to be sent to 
the L.D.S. Hospital. She asked him what he meant, 
"Is it cancer~" He said, (R. 106) "I wouldn't say 
it is. It doesn't look good." She went back two or 
three days later and saw Dr. Maw and Dr. Hatch. 
Dr. Maw told Dr. Hatch, "Mrs. Fredrickson has com-
plained about her throat ever since she had her ton-
sils pulled." Dr. Hatch said they should take a biopsy 
and give her some penicillin (R. 107). He asked if 
she had seen any other doctors ·and she said she had 
seen Dr. Browning that morning. He said, "Don't 
go around showing everybody your mouth. You come 
back here and let Dr. Maw take care of it.'' She went 
back to Dr. Maw that afternoon and two days later. 
He medicated the throat, said it looked better and 
said, "I don't believe it is cancer." She went back 
to Dr. Argyle for penicillin shots and he sent her 
to Dr. Cowan and Nielse.n as he thought (R. 108) it 
might be a cancer. They told her it wasn't cancer; 
that it was purely infection coming out of the tonsil hole. 
Dr. Argyle treated her all that winter for infec-
tion of the mouth, gave her hormone shots, penicillin 
shots ~nd mouth wash (R. 109). 
None of these doctors except Dr. Browning did any 
surgery or cutting in her mouth. 
During May 1948 she saw Dr. Sears. She had a big 
sore in her mouth (R. 110). He and Dr. Browning 
looked at it and sent her 'to Dr. Dolowitz, a throat 
specialist, whom she saw about May 10, 1948. He took 
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a biopsy to send to the Holy Cross Hospital, gave her 
some medicine and told her to come back in a couple 
of days (R. 111). The condition of her throat was 
terrible. There was a great big ulcer about the size 
of a dime on the left side just above the tonsil area. 
She went back per ;appointment, but Dr. Dolowitz 
did nothing more then (R. 112). She went back to 
Dr. Dolowitz on June 24, 1948 and Dr. Dolowitz took 
another biopsy. 
On June 26, 1948 at about 9:30 A.M. she had a 
terrible ulcer on the left side just above the tonsil 
area. She was washing it off with peroxide and water 
trying to get a little easement of it 'and it just po~ped 
open and she could see something hanging. She took 
a tweezers and pulled on it and there was this ungodly 
ragged thing dripping with pus. It was terrible. It was 
sticking out. She washed it off (R. 113) It looked like 
a piece of gauze or white material about three-fourths 
of an inch long 'and about a quarter of an inch wide. 
She was frightened. She was hysterical and tried to 
get it out. She tried with her fingers and the tweezers 
but couldn't get it out and then went to her neighbors 
to call her friend Mrs. Matthews and then to her 
daughter- in -law, Betty Fredrickson, and then to 
Dr. Dolowitz, accompanied by her daughter-in-law (R. 
115). We had to wait about an hour and a half to 
two hours to see him. He cleaned out the hole with 
penicillin and sprayed it. She thought the gauze was 
still there but evidently she had swallowed it, and all 
that was left was fragments. He picked out some 
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strings and showed them to her. He prescribed 'peni-
cillin every eight hours. She returned to Dr. Dolowitz 
and he would take out threads every time. 
When she got home she wondered if she had swal-
lowed the gauze and (R. 117) afterwards recovered 
it from the stool. She put it in some water in a fruit 
jar (R. 118) and finally in some alcohol. It has been 
in her possession ever since until delivered to her 
attorneys recently. 
Dr. Dolowitz put no packs, gauze or cotton in her 
mouth (R. 119). 
Exhibit "A" is a bottle containing some material 
that came out of an ulcer on the left side of her mouth 
at her home. The ulcer would break and these pieces 
and fragments would stick out (R. 120). She put them 
in alcohol. 
(It was stipulated that they have not been dis-
turbed by h,er attorney and the exhibit ·was admitted 
without objection.) 
Exhibit "B" contains material that came from the 
ulcer on the left side of the mouth. (Admitted without 
objection.) 
Exhibit "C" is material from the same ulcer on 
the left side (R. 122). (Admitted without objection). 
Exhibit "D" from the same ulcer (R. 123). 
(Admitted.) 
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~). 
Exhibit .. E'' frmn the same ulcer ( R. 124). 
(Admitted.) 
Exhibit "F" contains material that, on November 
8, 1948, appeared in an ulcer on the right side of the 
throat, at her hon1e. rrhere \Ya~ a bad ulcer there, about 
the size of a garden pea ; it broke and this rna terial 
came out; she S\Yallowed it and it was recovered the 
next day frmn the stool (R. 125). (Admitted without 
objection.) There are some other materials in bottles 
that she recoYered in the same \Yay. 
Prior to June 17, 1945 she weighed about 160 
pounds. She lost weight thereafter, about 60 pounds 
(R. 126). Her mental condition was terrible; she was 
nervous; she was sick after her tonsils were taken out; 
she didn't know what was the matter; nobody else 
knew what was the matter; she went from doctor to 
doctor until the family got disgusted with her; they 
thought it was all imagination and regarded her as 
off mentally and wouldn't let the grandchildren come 
to see her; she was humiliated and embarrassed (R. 
127) ; and then these ulcers broke in her mouth and 
she was ashamed to go around the children because 
she would stink; she could taste it; when she went 
any place she would sit by herself and wouldn't go 
around people; her people ignored her; they figured 
there was something wrong but didn't know what it was. 
When it was suggested that she had cancer shf~ 
felt that she might just as well commit suicide. After 
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June 1948 she felt much better. Her (R. 128) mind 
began to clear. 
The material that was recovered on June 29, 1948 
was ·put in the bottle marked Exhibit "A" (R. 130) 
and then turned over to Mr. Elton, her attorney. 
The ulcers that she saw would appear and disappear 
during the past three years (R. 146). One ulcer on 
the left side ·was just above the tonsil area and the 
other one on the left side was down in the tonsil area 
( R. 14 7). The one on the right was near the cheek, 
right down back of that tonsil (R. 148). It came out 
of the hole and spread on to the tongue. The one on 
the left was just above the tonsil. 
These strings came out of her mouth from June 
28 (1948) until about a month before trial (R. 150). 
Dr. Wright has been her dentist since 1935 (R. 
156). She doesn't remember what dentists extracted 
teeth for her before that. Between 1935 and January 
1946 she had teeth filled and cleaned but couldn't say 
if she had any pulled. In January 1946 she had only 
18 teeth, 10 at the bottom and 8 on the top; (or vice 
versa) (R. 157). They were all front teeth. By Janu-
ary 1946 she had lost all of her teeth except her front 
teeth. She didn't remember whether any teeth were 
extracted between 1935 and January 1946. Dr. Wright 
was the only dentist that treated her during that time. 
Since 1935 she has just had Dr. Wright as her 
dentist (R. 159) until Dr. Browning in July 1947. Dr. 
Sears makes teeth ; did no work in her mouth. 
10 
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i.,. 
·~ 
Frmn 1935 her doctors have been Dr. BouchPr, 
family doctor, then Dr. Moorehead. She was sent to him 
by Dr. Boucher: Dr. :Maw; Dr. Argyle in October 1946 , 
(R. 160). Dr. Boucher was the only doctor (medical) 
who treated her between 1935 and July 1945; and then 
Dr. Johnson of Murray. right after Dr. Boucher; then 
Dr. :J[oorehead: and then back to Dr. Boggess who had 
taken Dr. Boucher's place (R. 161), then Dr. Argyle; 
then Dr. Nielsen of Cowan & Nielsen; and of course 
Dr. Dolowitz (R. 162). Dr. Boucher is retired now. 
He lives in California. She went to Dr. Boggess for 
her throat (R. 163). Dr. Nielsen limits his practice to 
cancers and tumors. All of the doctors she mentioned 
except Dr. Boucher are still in Salt Lake County. 
During these four years she has gone from one 
doctor to another (R. i64). To all of these doctors she 
complained about her throat following her tonsillectomy 
in July 1945-nothing but that. She told all of these 
doctors everything, that she had had a tonsillectomy 
and had a sore throat throat ever since. 
[; In her deposition, taken in this case, she testified 
rrt that she couldn't say how many teeth Dr. Wright had 
Jlli extracted between 1935 and July 5, 1945. She would 
·!Jrj say two or three at most (R. 166). She didn't know, 
. 11. maybe there weren't any. He didn't extract any of 
~~ the very front teeth prior to July 5, 1945. The back 
:~ ones were extracted thirty years ago, more or less 
(R. 163) . 
• r. The first time she saw Dr. Maw after the operation 
was the middle of August (R. 171). She expected to have 
11 
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a sore throat following the operation. Thereafter she 
saw Dr. Maw about every three weeks. When her throat 
got so bad she couldn't stand it she would go back to 
him (R. 173). She didn't go to see Dr. Argyle until 
she discontinued seeing Maw. She could get no relief 
from the Clinic and she had to go somewhere. These . 
doctors gave me penicillin and sulfa. They could see 
the soreness there and so could she. 
Dr. Wright used no sponges, gauze, or packs in 
her mouth (R. 174). He made some dentures but her 
gums were so sore she couldn't use them (R. 175). He 
made two sets. She had these ulcers. Her whole mouth 
was sore (R. 177); her whole face was sore inside. 
Dr. Browning used no gauze (R. 179). She also 
visited Dr. Calvert (a dentist). He referred her to Dr. 
Sears. 
The contents of the bottle, "Exhibit "I", have 
been removed now. They were what was recovered in 
the stool on the first occasion (R. 200). 
MRS. VERA MATTHEWS 
She is a friend of Mrs. Fredrickson, has seen her 
often, at frequent intervals (R. 242). Between her ton-
sil operation and the summer of 1946 she had an 
extremely sore throat. She went down to one hundred 
pounds. She also observed Mrs. Fredrickson's mental 
condition. She was depressed a lot and sick a lot of 
mental trouble in that way, this sickness was upsetting 
her health to that extent (R. 243). 
12 
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On June 26, 1948 she saw l\[rs. Fredrickson, at 
home of witness, looked into her mouth; she saw this 
cotton or gauze hanging out of her throat, about one-
fourth of an inch wide, it looked about half an inch 
long, that resen1bled gauze to her (R. 244) on the left 
side of her throat. From the middle of 1948 her health 
improved (R. 245), physically and mentally; she is 
more cheerful. She is acquainted with gauze. Her 
whole mouth and gums were sore in 1946. She under-
stood that the reason she had her teeth out was because 
she had this soreness in her throat and it would help 
her arthritis (R. 250). It is her experience that people 
have their teeth pulled for things like that. 
l\Irs. Fredrickson started having trouble with her 
gums and mouth immediately after having her tonsils 
out. 
MRS. RUPP 
She lives in Taylorsville (R. 256), knows Mrs. 
Fredrickson, is a close and intimate friend. Saw her on 
June 26, 1948. On that date saw her at home of witness; 
looked in her mouth ; she acted like she was sick. She 
had a sore in the back of her mouth that was all red 
and pussy looking (R. 258), and it looked to have a 
piece of gauze hanging from this hole in her mouth; 
it looked like an awful bad sore. It looked about a 
quarter of an inch wide and half an inch long. She 
knows gauze. 
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SHERMAN FREDRICKSON 
Husband of plaintiff. Talked with Dr. Maw in 
April or May 1948. Asked Dr. Maw if the condition 
of her throat was a cancer. He said he didn't think 
it was. Asked if the trouble in her throat had any 
chance of affecting her mentally; he said no, he didn't 
think it would. Asked Dr. Maw what was really the 
matter of her throat and he couldn't tell me. He said, 
"She do.es have a sore throat'' (R. 260). 
Observed his wife's condition between tonsillectomy 
and summer of 1948. She was irritable, lost weight; 
she was 'Practically a nervous wreck. 
Has also observed her health from the summer of 
1948 to the present. She has gained weight, her nerves 
are much better; her mental attitude toward life in 
general is better. 
His wife had no trouble with her teeth prior to 
the tonsillectomy (R. 263). She had had some teeth 
removed several years ago, twenty years, probably 
twenty-five years. 
Dr. Wright didn't remove any of her teeth that 
he knew of. He didn't remove any teeth until he took 
out the eighteen. 
She had eighteen teeth removed because of a bad 
condition in her throat (R. 265). 
Dr. Wright did not put any packs or gauze in her 
mouth (R. 268) or any fabric or other material. 
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BETTY FREDRICKSON 
Daughter-in-law of plaintiff (R. 271). Has known 
her since 1939, close relationship. After tonsil opera-
tion she had sores, ulcers, running sores in her mouth, 
and showed them to witness from time to time; they 
were pussy (R. 273). They showed up at various places, 
around in the throat and around the gums and into 
the sides. She had arthritis and after the tpnsillectomy 
she got relief from that. During the year 1945 to 
June 1946 she lost a lot of weight and looked very 
bad. Her children noticed it ( R. 27 4). We were all 
concerned about her mental condition. She was in (} 
bad state. She was very nervous and had a horror of 
being dependent (R. 275) upon anyone to take care 
of her. 
She saw plaintiff on June 26, 1948. Plaintiff drove 
to her house. Plaintiff opened her mouth and she looked 
and could see a large pussy spot and what a'Ppeared 
to be a piece of gauze in it (R. 276). She observed 
some foreign materials, some threads and with a 
definite loose weave (R. 277), gauze. She was familiar 
with surgical gauze. It was a small piece, maybe slightly 
smaller than your finger tip. There was just a small 
tip showing, maybe around a quarter of an inch or 
half an inch (R. 278). It was still imbedded in the 
mouth. It was just above the tonsil area. Dr. Dolowitz 
brought out some tissue and threads. 
Between 1945 and June 1948 there had been an 
increase in plaintiff's nervousness, perpetual worrying 
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caused by her condition; wondering what was causing 
it and if she would ever get better; there was a definite 
strain in her relations to her husband and she lost 
weight (R. 282). During that time there was one sore, 
one infection after another in her throat and in her 
mouth (R. 283). The sore that she saw on July 26, 
1948 was about three-quarters of an inch in diameter 
(R. 285). It was at the back of the throat. She couldn't 
remember which side. It was less than an inch from 
the center ( R. 286). 
MR. McLACHLIN 
City Chemist since 1920 (R. 297). Identified Ex-
hibit "1" as a bottle that he received from attorney 
for plaintiff to make an analysis of the contents. I 
found there were small strings or solids or fibers of 
cotton. There appeared to be a substance similar to 
catgut, which he didn't have time to definitely deter-
mine. He took the fiber out that was in the bottom, 
boiled it with sodium hydroxide to determine whether 
there was animal matter other than cellulose and then 
stirred that with potassium iodide and iodine to get 
a color reaction for cotton and it showed positive, and 
he then put it under the microscope and compared it 
with other pieces of cotton gauze, and the reactions 
were similar all the way through (R. 298). 
His conclusion· was that it was cotton and that 
there was also a substance similar to catgut. 
Most of the material in the bottle was used in the 
examination. 
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He didn't see any fragments of bony substance. 
DR. BRO,VNING 
Knows the plaintiff; treated her July 7, 21 and 25, 
1947 (R. 303); took x-rays and on July 21st the lower 
anterior ridge \\·as opened. There \Vas a very spiney 
sharp ridge which was removed, making a smooth sur-
face, because she was having difficulty in wearing her 
dentures. It was from the left bicuspid to the right 
bicuspid; from the first double tooth to the first double 
tooth on the opposite (R. 303). She had no other 
teeth at that time ( R. 304). 
In doing that work he used no packs of any kind. 
Used no sponges. He used some sutures of dyed, 
black silk. No other foreign materials. An aspirator 
was used to remove the blood and keep the surface 
clear (R. 305). 
On July 25, 1947 he opened up the upper are,..a 
from the first molar to the first molar and curetted 
it but it wasn't bad; it wasn't like the lower. Also 
cleaned out the socket of the first molar. No pack, 
sponges or gauze were used, no sutures in the upper. 
X-rays taken show no bone fragments or spicules of 
bone (R. 306). 
He never used any catgut in his work in plaintiff':3 
mouth (R. 307). The silk sutures were removed in 
three to five days. He did no work in the rear of her 
mouth. Did no work in the area of the wisdoin teeth. 
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She was in his office many time complaining 
about a sore mouth, over a period of a year, probably 
once a month. Her mouth was very inflamed. At one 
time he saw a lesion near the very back edge of the 
soft palate (R. 312). The tonsil area was involved in 
the inflammation that he saw. It extended clear back 
to the uvula (R. 3.13). The ulceration that he saw, which 
caused the inflammation was not removed from the 
tonsil area. The distance is not too much, you are over 
the tonsil area ( R. 314). It was on the left, to the soft 
palate covering the tonsil area. 
DR. WRIGHT 
A dentist of Murray, Utah (R. 329). Mrs. Fred-
rickson known him since the fifth month of 1939. She 
has had no molar teeth since he has known her. 
On January 22, 1946 he extracted eighteen teeth 
for her. They were all anterior (front) teeth. Did not 
use any gauze or packs in her mouth. They were easy 
to take out, no dry sockets. Cotton packs or gauze 
packs are used only in the case of bleeders (R. 331) 
-not on the day the teeth are taken out but only if 
they come back as a bleeder. He has gauze in his 
office ; also cotton. 
About three months before January 22, 1946 she 
went to his office and said she was having trouble 
and wondered if it was from her teeth (R. 339). He 
told her he didn't figure the teeth were causing her 
trouble, and then she came in and said she wanted her 
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teeth out. Her teeth were too bad to leave in and too 
good to take out so he left it up to her ot decide. He 
told her they n1ight be causing the trouble but didn't 
think so. There was some pyorrhea, slight (R. 340). 
His records show that in 1939 he put in a filling. 
In 1940 he cleaned her teeth. In 1942 he cleaned her 
teeth; in 1943 he x-rayed her teeth; in June 1944 he 
put in two fillings; in August 1944 he put in a filling. 
DR. DOLOWITZ 
He is a physician S'pecializing in eye, ear, nose and 
throat (R. 182); met Mrs. Fredrickson on May 10, 
1948 ; the lymphoid tissue in the nasal pharnyx was 
red and angry looking (R. 184); in the mouth there 
was a small lesion about a c.m. quare at the junction 
of the hard and soft palate on the left side ( R. 185) ; 
a small ulcer with a pussy exudate. It would be about 
two-thirds of the way to the tooth from the anterior 
pillar (R. 186); on the illustration it would be the 
last upper tooth (R. 187); on May 14, 1948 he made 
an examination of her throat; there was still a good 
sized ulcer which seemed to be slightly closer to the 
gum, because of the biopsy which he took at the previous 
time to find whether or not cancer was present at the 
site of the lesion. On May 29, 1948 the ulcer had healed 
and there was one behind the gum, behind the teeth 
(R. 188) on the soft palate, about half an inch below 
the last tooth on the left side (using the exhibit as a 
reference). On June 24, 1948 the first ulcer was still 
present and he removed the whole ulcer, at the request 
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of the pathologis-t, to take a deep biopsy, very deeply, 
to be sure no cancer was in the tissue ; the ulcer had 
healed but broke down again (R. 189). 
On June 26th Mrs. Fredrickson came with a small 
abscess opposite the last lower molar. She stated it 
had ruptured and a sluff of dry blood and cotton came 
out. She brought a thread with her about an inch 
long, the sluff was about an inch in diameter with a 
c.m. deep, slightly less than half an inch (R. 189). 
On June 28th she came and stated that a large 
piece of gauze had started to come out of the hole, she 
was unable to remove it and had swallowed it. There 
was a hole with a few pieces of string which she re-
moved. There were three or four strings (R. 190). 
On July 1st the socket had healed but not well. 
He opened it and removed six tiny threads. I saw her 
off and on at frequent intervals from time to time. 
On October 25, 1948 he saw her; there was a slightly 
granulate, healing formation on the left side, just lateral 
to the tonsil fossa, the deep cavity which goes in here 
where the tonsil rests. 
There were two lesions when he saw her on N ovem-
ber 15, 1948; there was a slight healing of the wounds 
on the right side over the tonsil area (R. 191), midway 
between the right anterior pillar and the last tooth. 
There was some granulation at the first site and there 
was one thread which exuded there. 
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He saw her the following day, N ovmnber 16, 1948. 
The S\Yelling had spread around to the rheek side, just 
behind the first tooth and I removed a thread from 
. there. She had no natural teeth. 
"\Yhen she first arrived he suspected cancer and 
took tissue, then a deeper biopsy. "\Yhen the thread 
exuded he tried to find what it was. The ulcer healed 
from the bottom up instead of the top which meant 
to keep the top open or they would have a pocket again. 
He prescribed penicillin (R. 193). The anterior pillar 
of the tonsil area is the front pillar. The tonsil area 
is about three-quarters of an inch wide (R. 198) at 
the bottom. Tonsils vary tremendously in size (R. 199). 
In our average adult tonsils are from one inch and a 
quarter to three-quarters of an inch wide. They are 
from three-eighths of an inch to half an inch thick. 
They are slightly wider and thicker than an almond 
nut (R. 200). He indicated on Exhibit "1" with a red 
circle the approximate location of the ulcer that he 
saw on May lOth. He said he was guessing at the loca-
tion and that it was an approximation (R. 202). The 
circle which he placed on the diagram is closer to the 
normal position of the rear molar than the front pillar 
of the tonsil ( R. 206). 
He marked on the exl).ibit the location of the ulcer 
that he saw on May 14th, slightly closer to the gurn 
(R. 207). It was the same ulcer but larger as he took 
part of it in the biopsy (R. 208). 
When he saw her on May 29th there was another 
ulcer. He identified it with a "3" on the exhibit. It 
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was about a half c.m. to a c.m. below the last tooth 
on the left side (R. 211). 
On June 24th the first and second ulcers had re-
opened and recurred, and he took another biopsy. 
On June 26th there was a small abscess interposed 
between '' 1 '' and '' 2 '' on the diagram. An abscess 
is imbedded deeper in the tissue. This abscess was 
about one c.m. in diameter (R. 213). It had ruptured 
and she had pulled out a slough of dried blood and 
cotton. He saw no gauze. He saw a thread that Mrs. 
Fredrickson had. 
On June 28th she told me she had seen a piece of 
gauze and that she had pulled on it and had lost it 
(R. 215) and she was extremely frightened. On that 
occasion he removed a few more pieces of string (R. 
216). The abscess was deeper. In July he found six 
threads. When he saw the threads he felt it wasn't can-
cer, something was irritating deeper, foreign pieces, 
threads ( R. 217). 
On July 29th an ulceration broke out on the right 
side, almost in the same position on the opposite side 
of the mouth, a little bit lower (R. 217). It was marked 
with a "4" on the exhibit. Mrs. Fredrickson insisted 
the feeling of gauze but he couldn't see any (R. 219). 
September 16th ulcer "4" was still drawing pus 
(R. 220). On September 23rd a small white hard mass 
worked out to the surface of the ulcer and it was 
removed by biopsy forceps under local anesthesia, it 
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looked like cartilage with a small green core next to it 
of infected mater·ial (R. 221). Cartilage is found in vari-
ous parts of the body, uot around or in the teeth. It is 
found in the region of ulcer No. 4. 
On November 16th the swelling In the mouth had 
spread to her teeth, where the teeth would normally 
be found. There was a small ulcerated area coming 
level with the left buckle surface, a small granulation 
was removed with a thread in the center (R. 223) right 
in the area of the teeth. It was marked on Exhibit 
"1" with a "5". 
He never saw threads or gauze excepting as indi-
cated but Mrs. Fredrickson told him some came from 
No. 4 ulcer and there was an enlarged ·perforation there 
(R. 225 ). 
(This is the evidence which should have been and 
was considered by the trial court in ruling on the mo-
tion for non-suit.) 
(b) 
The following admissions and additional facts 
favorable to plaintiff appeared by evidence of defendants. 
DR. MUIRHEAD 
Saw plaintiff on April 5, 1946 (R. 377). She com-
plained of pain, discomfort and some swelling of her 
throat from an operation last fall. 
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He would be shocked and surprised to find that 
Bhortly thereafter there exuded from that area a quan-
tity of cotton and catgut (R. 378). In the light of his 
examination he would be very much surprised to find 
that condition existing (R. 379). 
DR. MAW 
He described a tonsil operation. He opens up the 
whole cavity of the tonsil. When the operation is first 
done there is of course an indentation, the muscles 
haven't reacted; this is all muscle cavity when the ton-
sil is taken out. 
The patient, the nurse and Dr. l\1aw were the only 
ones that were ·present (R. 388). His recollection is 
that a sister of Mrs. Fredrickson was at the foot of 
the bed. 
He used gauze sponges in this operation on ~Irs. 
Fredrickson (R. 389). Exhibit "3" is the type. In 
cases of quite severe hemorrhage he uses that size. 
If there is just a little oozing he cuts it in smaller 
pieces and touches the fossa and catches the bleeder 
and ties it off with catgut (R. 390). In every local 
there is a certain amount of bleeding. He fastens the 
sponge to the hemostat and sponges it off. 
If the patient spits blood, if it should be that he 
cuts a large vessel, he takes a large sponge pack in 
her throat, holds it for a few minutes with the instru-
ment, gradually takes it down to see where the bleeding 
is, ties it with catgut, and if there is another wipes it 
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off and proceeds the same until all are tied off ( R. 
39:2). He doesn't recall whether there was a largE~ 
amount of bleeding in the operation on ~lrs. Fredrickson. 
Exhibit "5" is the type of catgut that was used 
on Mrs. Fredrickson ( R. 395). 
The tonsil is in a little capsule and when you takf~ 
the tonsil out sometimes a piece of the root of the 
tonsil will be through the capsule into the muscle and 
you can't see it, and it may grow. You check to see 
that all is removed (R. 396). 
As many as twelve to fifteen of these little sponges 
may be used in an operation. 
He instructed Mrs. Fredrickson to stay home during 
the period of convalescence. He did not see her again, 
she did not call him, and he presumed everything was 
all right (R. 397). He left Salt Lake on August 1st 
and returned August 9th. He saw her on August 18th. 
It had practically healed ( R. 398). 
On September 4th, 1945 she complained of sore 
throat; pharnyx was inflamed. This area is in the back 
of the throat, behind the back pillar of the tonsil (R. 
407-408). 
She complained of a sore throat every time she 
came in, and he saw nothing except that chronic inflamed 
pharnyx (R. 409). 
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On October 3, 1946 she complained of a dry sore 
throat, especially on the right side (R. 411). He gave 
her sulphathyazol. 
On October 28, 1947 she complained of pain about 
her second and third molar tooth on the right side (R. 
412). He could see nothing that was causing her di;~­
comfort. He told her to go see her dentist. 
When Mrs. Fredrickson first came to him in July 
1945, her sinuses were clear. There was no abscessed 
sinus in her case. She did not manifest or disclose to 
him any prior operation in her throat (R. 403). No 
surgery in her throat. Exce'!pt for her infected tonsil 
the throat tissue appeared to be normal. 
He was shown Exhibit "F", which one of his wit-
nesses said was a mass of threads, and asked if it was 
undigested food material. 
''I think I remember seeing this ; I couldn't say it 
it thread. My gauze is a lot larger than this. I was 
looking for gauze; this looks like cotton to me; cotton 
threads." Now it looks lik'e cotton threads. 
There is a way by which it can be determined 
whether this is undigested food. He can check it, surely. 
It was his opinion when he gave his deposition 
that if Mrs. Fredrickson wanted a cure she should 
go to her dentist; that her troubles were dental (R. 472). 
"Q. Yes and had not Dr. Dolowitz taken that deep 
biopsy during June of 1948 which released that foreign 
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substance that throat condition would have continued 
much longer than it did, would it not, Dr. Maw Y 
• • A. You spoke of the tonsil fossa. He never made 
an opening in the tonsil fossa. He made an opening 
possibly the third molar tooth-not the tonsil fossa,-
if you want me to answer that. 
'' Q. Doctor, he placed it about half an inch from 
that spot there, about half of an inch from that, didn't 
he? 
"A. And next to the third molar tooth. 
Q. If that extends back there, as one of your wit-
nesses said, some half to o/gths of an inch, that would be 
right above the tonsil fossa, wouldn't it? 
''A. Above it. 
'' Q. Laterally? 
"A. No, above it, above the tonsil. 
"Q. If that is half of an inch from the mouth of 
the tonsil fossa, and that fossa extended back there 
from half to o/8ths that would be right above it, wouldn't 
it~ 
''A. The tonsil fossa very seldom extends past the 
anterior pillar there, that is within half of an inch dis-
tant frorn your ulcerated spot there. 
'' Q. Yes, and had she pursued your advice of going 
to have her teeth cleaned, and some more bridge work 
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done, she would still have been an afflicted woman, 
wouldn't she, Doctor~ 
''A. I didn't ask her to have the teeth cleaned, 
there were no teeth to be cleaned. 
'' Q. Or gums cleaned~ 
''A. Take any infected area around the gums. 
'' Q. You said infection area, the whole rear of 
her mouth. 
''A. I never said it was the whole rear of her mouth. 
''Q. Haven't you, Doctor~ 
"A. It only involved the tonsils, around the third 
molar tooth" (R. 473). 
At his request (R. 475) ~Irs. Fredrickson went to 
Dr.· Kerby for an x-ray. She submitted herself to that 
x-ray for his own satisfaction and Dr. Kerby took what 
he was asked to take by Dr. Maw for the purpose of 
showing source of the bone spicules and to find if there 
wli:s infection there. There was no bony involvement at 
that time. 
(That was In January 1949.) 
ALICE EMERY 
Formerly named Armour (R. 481), registered nurse 
at the Clinic, assigned to Dr. l\£a\\'. Dr. Maw used a 
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sponge to tap the blood as it comes from that area; 
it was a light piere of g·auze (R. 487). 
··Q. Free and unattached from the hemostat, did 
Dr. ~la-w ever use a sponge in the mouth, or tonsil area'? 
"A. I don't knou· that he did. No, he usually con-
nects them zcitll the hemostat and taps, and doesn't 
leave them in." 
She has seen many throats after an operation. 
The tonsil fossa after the tonsillectomy is a dark red 
area, in a sac, just before you see the pillars; you look 
into the throat and there would be two deep red areas 
on. either side (R. 488). 
DR. DOLOWITZ 
He thought it unlikely that gauze and threads left 
in the tonsil fossa could have migrated that far (to the 
places where they were exuded). 
As a matter of fact in reading the history of cases, 
practically anything is p~ossible (R. 500). There are 
migratory bodies and numerous instances of the most 
fantastic things. Wierd things happen but usually the 
migration is downward. His experience is very limited 
with this; those he has seen have always been down-
ward. It is possible for them to go laterally. 
He removed threads between the 28th of June 1948 
and the 16th day of November, 1948. Long after May 
and June these ulcers were occurring and recurring (R. 
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502). That has gone on constantly. This ulcerated con-
dition continued to the date he last saw her on 8 eptem-
ber 15, 1949. He never inserted any gauze within the 
mouth or body of Mrs .. Fredrickson nor did he see any-
one else do it. 
"Q. (By Mr. Thurman) Now July 1, 1948 you said 
there was some gauze or threads seen in one of the 
ulcers, where was that~ 
''A. In the same ulcer, ts apvarently working up 
from beneath. 
Mr. Rich: Working up from what~ 
''A. Working up from the bottom of the ulcer. 
"Q. 'Working up? 
''A. You have a hole- I would like to draw a dia-
gram. 
'' Q. Now, in case of an ulcer or abscess if some for-
eign material were in the bottom of that, what would 
nature do to expell that thread~ 
''A. It would expell it. 
"Q. And that is when the ulcer works upward? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. In expelling the thread. 
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''A. \Vhen we say upward it is upward from the 
ulcer, but it would be lateral.'' Not vertically upward. 
On November 8th a large mass of mate1·ial sluffed 
out of the right side of the throat in the region marked 
by a 4. 
He found some threads on January 11, 1949 in the 
first ulcers 1 and 2 ( R. 506). 
During Mrs. Fredrickson's visits to him she may 
have stated that she removed threads from the tonsil 
area but he doubts it because there is nothing in his 
notes (R. 507). 
(He was asked to read his note from Nov. 15, 1948, 
which he did as follows :) 
" 'Patient comes in reporting that on the 8th of No-
vember a large mass of material sluffed out of the right 
side of the throat at the pole of the tonsil slightly back-
ward,' that is my way of putting it, slightly behind the 
pole area, 'and upward toward the upper teeth. A large 
pocket was formed and she reported to Dr. Argyle. She 
brings in some material which she recovered from her 
stool believing it to be the material she swallowed. I 
am unable to tell her what it is composed of, and sug-
gested if she really wishes to know to contact a labora-
tory. The hole is almost healed though there is still 
some infection. At the site of the granulation that I 
removed on the first there is one thread that I removed. 
No other foreign body seen. There was some pus sur-
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rounding this. She insists there is still further foreign 
body deeper in. To continue hot packs and icthyol packs. 
Advise against probing for further material at thls 
time.''' 
That is the abscess from which he made the second 
biopsy. 
If he hadn't cut that deep biopsy the gauze wouldn't 
have been able to work out (R. 515). 
DR. SNOW 
The normal tonsil in. an adult is over one inch, one 
half inch thick by 5/8 of an inch wide ( R. 423). Thick 
is depth. It becomes enlarged with disease. 
The cavity, after the tonsil is removed is called the 
fossa ( R. 425). It is exactly the size of the tonsil. It is 
of varying depths, occasionally very shallow and the 
tonsil protrudes; sometimes the tonsils look small and 
upon taking them out we discover they are very deep, 
from half to three quarters of an inch deep. 
After the tonsil is removed the area between the 
pillars fills with scar tissue (R. 429) and is skinned over 
with mucous membrane, the lining of the throat. When 
the tonsil is removed scar tissue commences to form (R. 
430). 
It is not the practice in this locality to sew the 'Pil-
lars together (R. 433). If it were sewed in the gauze 
would stay five or six days (R. 434). At the end of that 
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time the sutures or the stitches would sluff away. 'Tlw 
gauze would then be expelled (R. 435). 
There are various methods of taking care of exces-
sive bleeding (R. 439). 
He has heard of the method of controlling bleedin.r; 
by pu.tting a packing in the tonsil and suturing it. It is 
described in the l iteratwre. He has never seen it done. 
It is described and damned (R. 440). 
He did not consider it good practice ~n this area 
to do that. 
It would not be a good practice in this area to leave 
a piece of sponge dressing, gauze in the throat. 
If a tonsillectomy is properly performed food or 
any other foreign S'ltbstance should not accumulate tn 
the tonsil fossa; or in the area circled (on Exhibit 1). 
If a piece of gauze were to become imbedded in the 
tonsil area and then covered over by scar tissue it could 
develop a foreign body reaction and the sponge would be 
expelled by an abscess (R. 441). Eventually it would be 
expelled. It would accumulate pus. Pus is the result 
of breaking dott'n of the tissue. Infection would cause 
bone to disintegrate (R. 442). Bacteria from the dis-
eased area~ Infection means the presence of bacteria. 
If the infection extends to the bony area it could cause 
disintegration of the bony area. 
In order to bury a .p~ece of gauze in the tonsil fossa 
you would have to make an incision through the muscle 
and bury it deep in that muscle (R. 444). 
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If gauze ·came out of the area marked 1 and 2 on 
Exhibit 1, on the anterior surface of the pillar, outside 
the pillar, presumably that gauze had been in there 
thirty days previously (R. 451). Gauze a quarter of an 
inch thick, half an inch long, would certainly form an 
abscess within a few weeks, certainly within a month 
would be the length of time. It might have remained a 
little longer than thirty days-not sixty days (R. 452). 
"Q. So if a piece of gauze came out of that area 
marked 1 and 2 on Exhibit '' 1 '' it was placed there 
within sixty days ~ 
''A. Surely.'' 
Exhibit F was handed to the witness and he was 
asked if that was a small piece. 
''A. No, those are large pieces of thread. 
'' Q. Those are large pieces of thread. 
''A. It is a large mass of thread. 
"Q. It is a large mass of thread, no question about 
that at all, is there doctor~ 
"A. No." 
According to his op1nwn, to his professional opin-
ion, if those came out of an individual's body at the 
place indicated with a 4 on Exhibit 1 that had to have 
been placed in that body within thirty or sixty days of 
that time. 
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''A. Correct.'' 
"Q. No question about that¥ 
"A. No.'' 
His proessional opm1on was (R. 453) that masses 
of thread that size placed in those areas in the muscle 
would be shown evidently as exuding from the body 
within thirty to sixty days. 
'' Q. And then conversely it had to be placed 1n 
there within that time~ 
"A. Yes." 
DR. CLEARY: 
In his opinion a foreign body that manifests itself 
on the 28th day of June, 1948 had to have been placed 
in there within a few days before that date. 
The balance of the evidence of defendant and his 
witnesses was in conflict with the evidence of plaintiff 
and the conflict was resolved by the jury in favor of 
plaintiff. 
Therefore, in considering the motion for directed 
verdict, the foregowing admissions were before the trial 
court in addition to the evidence of plaintiff and her 
witnesses. 
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ARGUMENT 
Points 1 and 2 
Counsel argues these points together. They are, of 
course, different. At the close of plaintiff's case the 
following basic facts were established: That prior to 
Dr. Maw's operation she had never had any operation 
in her throat where gauze or sponges were used; that 
after the operation no doctor or dentist had done any 
work in her throat or mouth where gauze or sponges 
were used; that not doctor or dentist other than Dr. 
Maw had ever performed any surgery in her throat; 
that Dr. l\1:aw made an incision in her throat and used 
gauze sponges in connection therewith; that the oper-
ation took about an hour; that immediately following 
the operation she felt like there was a lump in her throat; 
that this lum·p continued to exist until the gauze came 
out; that immediatly following the operation and prac-
tically to the date of trial her throat, including the tonsH 
area and right in the hole of the tonsil became ulcerated, 
abscessed, diseased and infected; and that there was 
finally exuded from her throat, immediately near ead1 
tonsil, two pieces of gauze sponge - one on either side 
- which were the source and cause of her physical and 
mental suffering and damage; that thereafter her health 
improved; that in the meantime she had been unable to 
ascertain the cause of her trouble, although she had 
told defendant, his nurse, Dr. Muirhead and her family 
about the lump in her throat following the operation. 
All other possible sources of the malpractice, excepting 
Dr. Maw, were excluded by the evidence. 
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At the conclusion of the rase there was to be con-
sidered by the trial court Dr. ~law'~ denial plus the 
opinion of fellow members of his profession, that it 
couldn't occur. rrhis created a conflirt in the evidence, 
and the jury saw fit to belieYe the circumstantial evi-
dene of plaintiff and to disbelieve the evidence of de-
fendants. 
In addition there were certain admissions and addi-
tional evidence gained from defendant's witnesses which 
strengthened plaintiff's case. 
Counsel quotes at length from the evidence of his 
witnesses, ignoring the fact that such evidence did no 
more than create a conflict and is not to be considered 
as against the verdict of the jury and the ruling of the 
trial court. 
Dr. :Jiaw stands before this court the same as any 
other individual who, operating alone without witnesses, 
was the only one who actually knew what occurred but 
whose word is in conflict with the proven facts from 
which inferences may be drawn at variance with his 
evidence. 
EJrpert witnesses need not be believed if their opin-
ions are not believable in the light of the evidence. 
Mrs. Fredrickson had a tonsillectomy to aid her 
arthritis. Dr. Maw performed the operation. He made 
an incision on each side of her throat; used several gauze 
sponges and catgut sutures to stop the bleeding. Whe-
ther he had to go beyond the tonsil area because they 
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were imbedded and then forgot that he had done so, or 
whether he packed the area and sutured it in, intending 
later to remove it, or whether some other incident arose 
which caused him to leave these two pieces of gauze 
spong there - one on either side- is known only by Dr. 
Maw. He denied that he did it. He admitted, however, 
that he did not follow his usual practice in this case. 
Usually he has his patients return the following day for 
a checkup. In this ease he did not do so. Dr. Maw did 
not see her again until over a month after the operation. 
In the meantime scar tissue covered the tonsil cavity. 
Immediately she felt a lump in her throat. She told him 
and his nurse about it. He thought it was sinus and kept 
on treating her for that and she kept going back. Her 
throat was sore, ulcers broke out, she told him it felt like 
a lump in her throat. For a year and a half he treated 
her for sinus, getting no results. 
She had never had sinus trouble. She had never had 
any prior surgery in her throat. The only man who ever 
worked there was Dr. J\Iaw. 
Her whole mouth became sore, inflamed and ulcer-
ated. In her desperation she finally thought she might 
have bad teeth and that they were causing the infection 
in her mouth. She had eighteen front teeth. She had 
them out. When that failed to cure the trouble she 
went back to Dr. Maw. He gave her ·penicillin. She went 
to Dr. Boucher, her family physician. He gave her sulfa 
and penicillin. She went to his successors, Dr. Johnson 
and Dr. Boggess. They gave her penicillin. She went 
to Dr. Muirhead (Moorehead) referred there by Dr. 
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Boucher, told him she had a lun1p in her throat, following· 
a tonsillecton1y, and had had a sore throat and rrwuth 
ever since. He could see nothing and referred her back 
to Dr. Boucher for more penicillin. For three years this 
continued. 
In the meantime, in her terror at being unable to get 
cured of this throat condition, she continued to consult 
Dr. :Maw. On one of those occasions he suggested the 
possibility of cancer. He said it didn't look good. They 
took a biopsy. She then consulted cancer experts. Dr. 
:Maw was the first one to put the thought in her mind-
and there it rernained until Dr. Dolowitz uncovered the 
two gauze sponges imbedded in her throat. 
In _l\lay 1948, nearly three years after the operation, 
she was sent to Dr. Dolowitz by Drs. Browning and Sears~ 
who still suspected cancer. He took several biopsies, one 
of them deep, which released the gauze, and out came a 
quantity of gauze and thread, on each side, right near the 
place of the operation performed by Dr. Maw. 
Who, other than Dr. l\Ia\Y, had ever performed sur-
gery in her throat~ No one. She said so. Dr. Maw said 
so. 
This made a case for the jury. 
The fact that plaintiff's case rest upon circumstan-
tial evidence in the face of defendant 't denial does not 
defeat her case. The fact that no eye-witness other than 
the ·defendant, either alone or corroborated by othen;, 
testifies to what he claims did not occur has never yet 
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saved a defendant from the convicting effect of circum-
stantial evidence if believed by the jury to be more con-
vincing as to its truthfulness. Plaintiff made a case for 
the jury under the following authorities: 
Carruthers v. Phillips, 169 Ore. 636, 131 Pac. 2d 193. 
Plaintiff had an operation for prolapsed uterus. 
Nearly two years later a gauze spong was discovered 
in her bladder. Defendant testified that he never cut the 
bladder, inserted no gauze into her bladder, and never at 
any time put gauze in her body, hence couldn't have left 
any. The operation for removal of the gauze sponge was 
by another surgeon. Plaintiff testified that she never 
had any operation prior to the repair of her uterus by 
defendant and that she never at any time put any guaze 
into her body.- Plaintiff's evidence further showed that 
the bladder was exposed, a new bladder wall built up, 
cutting was done, gauze sponges were used by defendant, 
and a gauze sponge was removed twenty-one months 
later. The Supreme Court of Oregon held this sufficient 
to present a jury question. 
"* * * Plaintiff was entitled to show that the 
defendant had opportunity to do the act charged. 
This she did show. She was entitled to go fur-
ther and show that the defendant was the only 
one who could have done the act charged. This, 
too, she supported by her testimony. If the jury 
believed the evidence which she introduced, it was 
entitled to find that the defendant had inserted 
the gauze in her bladder and permitted it to re-
main there. When the doing of an act by the de-
fendant is charged, evidence is admissible to show 
that the defendant had opportunity to do it, even 
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though his opportunity be not shown to be exclu-
sive, buts ·Since the sho-wing of opportunity 
leaves open all the hypotheses of other person's 
eqttal opportunity, it l:s proper for the proponent 
of the evidence to strellgthen it by cutting off, so 
far as poss-ible these other hypotheses, i.e., by 
showing that the person charged was one of a 
few only, or the sole person, having the oppor-
tunity. In other words, 1rhile the proponent need 
not, he may always show exclusive opportunity.' 
1 \Yigmore on Evidence, 2nd Ed., sec. 131. In 
the case at bar the evidence for the plaintiff, if 
believed, \Yas sufficient to warra~t the jury in 
finding that gauze was placed and remained in 
plaintiff's bladder and that the defendant had 
opportunity and was the only one who did have 
opportunity to place it there and therefore that 
the defendant did the act charged. See Moore v. 
Ivey, Tex .. Civ. A:pp., 264 S.W. 283. 
''Furthermore, there was ample evidence 
concerning proximate causation and damage. If 
gauze was inserted in the bladder and allowed 
to remain there, it resulted in the condition de-
scribed by Dr. Hunter, causing infection and 
pain and requiring operative removal. The evi-
dence of negligence is likewise substantial. No 
question of liability for mistake of professional 
judgment was involved. No one claimed that the 
gauze should have been inserted in the bladder. 
No one claimed that if so inserted its removal at 
the time of the operation would involve any 
exercise of professional judgment. Compare Ray-
burn v. Day, 1928, 126 Or. 135, at page 148, 268 
P. 1002, 59 A.L.R. 1062. No one claimed that any 
incision of the bladder wall should have been 
made. The whole defense was that no incision 
was made, no gauze inserted and none left in. * * 
41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Upon presentation of evidence that a physi-
cian inserted gauze in and failed to remove it 
from an incision, it has been frequently held that 
he became guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law. McCormick v. Jones, 1929, 152 Wash. 508, 
278 P. 181, 65 A.L.R. 1019; Moore v. Ivey, supra 
(citing 21 R.C.L. 388); Ruth v. Johnson, 8 Cir., 
172 F. 191, Wynne v. Harvey, 1917, 96 Wash. 379, 
165 P. 67. 
''Instances may perhaps arise in which such 
a conclusion would be prop:er, but it cannot be 
asserted as a general rule. In the case of Ray-
burn v. Day, supra, where the ·proprierty of in-
serting the gauze in the operative field was un-
questioned, the evidence disclosed an emergency 
situation in which the propriety of removing or 
not removing the gauze became one of profes-
sional judgment. In such a case it could not be 
said that the closing of an incision without re-
moving the sponge was negligence as a matter 
of law. But even in Rayburn v. Day, the question 
was one for the jury. The standard of skill and 
care which the law imposes upon the surgeon in 
the performance of an operation is not limited 
in its application to the use of the knife. He 
must also use skill in the removal of surgical 
sponges. Rayburn v. Day, supra; 41 Am. J ur., 
p. 213, sec. 97. While the failure to remove 
sponges may not in all instances constitute a 
breach of the surgeon's duty to use the req:uired 
care and skill, still it is generally held to require 
the submission of the question of negligence to 
the jury. It is prima facie negligence for an 
operating surgeon to leave a surgical S'ponge in 
a wound after the incision is closed. 41 Am. Jur., 
p. 213, sec. 97. 
* * * * * 
"We are referred by the defendant to an 
opinion by Judge Jaggard in Staloch v. Holm, 
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100 l\linn. :276, 111 N.,V. 2li4, 266, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 
712, wherein a distinction is made between the 
standard of care in ordinary negligence cases and 
in actions for n1alpractice. In the former the 
test is the conduct of the ordinary prudent man 
under the circumstances, and 'that a man has 
acted according to his best judgment is no de-
fense', whereas in a malpractice actions, the fact 
that the want of success was due to an error of 
judgn1ent may sometimes be a defense. Assum-
ing the distinction to have been accurately stated, 
the answer is that in the case at bar there was 
no question concerning the exercise of profes-
sional judgn1ent, mistaken or otherwise, so far 
as the placing or removal of a sponge was con-
cerned. The defendant cannot now claim that he 
made a mere error of judgment in failing to re-
move a sponge which he swears he never inserted. 
It follows that if the instruction of the court 
applied to this case the standard of care ap-
plicable to ordinary negligence cases, then the 
instruction was unduly favorable to the defend-
ant who was under obligation to exercise that 
degree of skill, care, diligence and knowledge 
which is ordinarily possessed by the average of 
the members of his profession in good standing 
in similar localities. * * * 
In malpractice the circumstances are pecu-
liar, and so the general rule is peculiarly adapted 
to meet then1. Among the circumstances are the 
Rkill and training of the physician, the inherent 
difficulties of operative treatment, the impossi-
bility of certainty in diagnosis and cure, and the 
frequent necessity for the exercise of professional 
judgment, together with the advanced condition 
of the medical science on the community. Judge 
Haggard, in the case cited supra, after explain-
ing that a surgeon is not liable for a mere error 
in judgment, makes the following distinction: 
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' When the physician is actually operating he is 
employing surgery as an art, and if, for example, 
he * * * sew up a sponge in an abdomen has been 
opened, * * * his wrong concerns physical facts, 
and has fairly been held to be governed by ordi-
nary principles of negligence.' " 
Winchester v. Chabut, ______ Mich.------, 32 N.W. 2d 358. 
Plaintiff sued for malpractice in leaving a gauze 
~ponge in an incision after an open operation for reduc-
tion of comminuted fracture of the femur. Defendant 
denied that a sponge was left and contended that the 
abscesses were caused by bone spicules working out. 
There was no direct evidence that a sponge had been 
left. Plaintiff testified that pieces of cotton gauze 
worked out and were discharged from the abscesses 
after they had been lanced. Defendant in turn testified 
that such pieces of gauze were some that he inserted in 
the abscesses for drainage. Plaintiff denied this. A 
motion for directed verdict was made; it was denied 
and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. We quote 
the following from the opinion of the Michigan Supreme 
Court sustaining the verdict: 
''Defendant contends that the court should 
have directed a verdict for him because there was 
neither direct nor medical nor scientific evidence 
establishing or tending to establish the leaving 
of a sponge in the wound and no evidence of mal-
practice. Lack of direct evidence of the alleged 
act of negligence is not fatal to plaintiff's case 
when there is evidence from which an inference 
to that effect may legitimately be drawn. LeFaive 
v. Asselin, 262 Mich. 443. Defendant insists that 
the extrusion of several pieces of cotton gauze 
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fron1 different abscesses is not evidence from 
which it may be inferred that a gauze sponge vvas 
left in the wound berause testimony of doctors 
sworn for the defense was that the physical re-
action and natural processes in extruding such 
sponge, consisting of one piece of gauze about 
15 inches square and folded and refolded into a 
3 inch square, would be to encapaulate it and ex-
trude it in one mass at one opening and that na-
ture in this process does not unfold, separate and 
twist it in strands and extrude them separately 
in various places in the manner in which extru-
sion of gauze is alleged to have occurred in this 
case. However, the testimony of one of defend-
ant's expert witnesses was that it might con-
ceivably be erupted through one or more absces-
ses. There was thtts a question of fact for the 
jury and testimony from whi'ch an inference 
might leg-itimately be drawn that the extrusion of 
bits of gauze from the several abscesses was 
occasioned by leaving a gauze sponge in the 
wound at the time of the operation. That this did 
not constitute good medical practice need not 
have been (LeFaive v. Asselin, supra), but was, 
shown by the testimony of expert witnesses. As 
said in Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 383, 
even tlz e 1nerest tyro would know this was im-
proper. A doctor sworn for the plaintiff testified 
that, under the history of the case, after the 
abscesses occurred good practice required more 
than mere lancing, as was done by defendant in 
this case, but rather, exploratory surgery to dis-
cover the cause of the abscesses. The question of 
defendant's negligence or malpractice in this 
connection was one for the jury. 
"Defendant also contends that the verdict is 
against the great weight of the evidence because 
his experts testified that the presence of a 
sponge in the wound after suturing would cause 
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certain reactions which did not occur in this case; 
but the doctor sworn for plaintiff testified that 
the reactions could be such as plain tiff claims 
did occur in this case. The doctors testifying for 
defendant and plaintiff agreed that plaintiff had 
not enjoyed the normal recovery to be expected 
in the abscence of untoward occurrences at or 
after the operation; that x-ray pictures show 
malunion of the bone and that this could result 
from infection caused by leaving a surgical 
sponge in the wound. There is competent evi-
dence to support plaintiff's theories in this case 
and we cannot say that the verdict is against the 
great weight of the evidence." 
Aderhold v. Stewart, 172 Okla. 72, 46 Pac. 2d 340. 
Plaintiff sued for malpractice in leaving a surgical 
gauze sponge in her body following an appendectomy. 
During the operation the surgeon (defendant) discov-
ered that she had gallstones, made a second incision 
and removed the gallstones, placed a drainage in the 
lower (appendix) incision, removed the tube and gauze 
used for drainage about two weeks later, and then per-
mitted her to go home. Thereafter the upper incision 
for gallstones healed but the lower one continued to 
discharge pus and did not heal. She went back to de-
fendant, vYho probed for foreign matter, found none 
and sent her home where she consulted her local physi-
cian. She then returned to defendant, six months after 
the original operation and he removed a piece of gauze. 
She asked the doctor how that happened and he said, 
''It was left in there.'' 
Defendant testified that he did not leave any sponge 
in plaintiff's body; that he did not find any sponge on 
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,; .... 
the occasion of his examination when he probed for 
foreign objects; that the sponge that he removed in 
Decen1ber was not the kind of sponge that he used in 
the operation; that he and the nurse counted the sponges 
that were used and that there were none missing; that 
none were left. The nurses testified to the same effect. 
Plaintiff testified that neither she nor her husband 
nor anyone else had placed any sponge or gauze in the 
wound between the date of the operation and the date 
of its removal. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma said this made a 
case for the jury, and used the following language in 
sustaining the verdict for plaintiff: 
''In the case before us we have a direct con-
flict of testimony as to the basic fact in this ~ 
The defendant's testimony is to the effect that 
he used about 41 sponges in the body of plain-
tiff during the operation; that he did not leave any 
of these sponges in the plaintiff's body, but that 
he did remove a sponge from her wound on De-
cember 30. The plaintiff's testimony was to the 
effect tha"C no one else ever placed any sponge 
in her body at any time. Under these circum-
stances two questions arise : 
"(1) Did the defendant leave a sponge in 
the body of plaintiff from June 19 to December 
30~ 
'' ( 2) If he did so, was this negligence on 
his part~ 
''We believe these are properly jury ques-
tions and that the trial court committed no error 
in submitting these questions to the jury." 
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Jackson v. Hansard, 45 Wyo. 201, 17 Pac. 2d 659: 
Plaintiff claimed defendant left a large sponge in 
his abdomen following an appendectmny. A sponge was 
discharged through the rectum three months and ten 
days following the operation. 
Plaintiff testified that he commenced having severe 
pains in his abdomen shortly after the operation; that 
he complained to defendant of the condition; that he 
w:as given medicine; that he went to other doctors and 
hospitals, including Mayo Brothers and the Veterans 
Hospital; that he got no relief until the sponge was 
discharged. 
Defendant testified that he did the operation; that 
large and small sponges were used; that all sponges 
were counted and checked and none were left in plain-
tiff's body; that hemostats were attached to all large 
sponges used and that it was impossible for S'ponges to 
became lost. 
Plaintiff further testified that he never placed the 
gauze in his rectum and did not swallow it. 
At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court 
granted a motion for judgment for defendant notwith-
standing a verdict for plaintiff. In reversing this ruling 
of the trial court, the following is said: 
"In view of the conflict in the testimony, the 
question as to the size and character of the gauze 
or sponge removed from plaintiff, and as to 
whether it was or was not the same kind of gauze 
as used in the operation, was for the jury. 
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• ·Counsel for the defendant argue that it is 
iinprobable, if not impossible, that a sponge or 
gauze of the size claimed by the plaintiff to have 
beE'n rernoYE'd from him should have penetrated 
into and passed through the large intestines. Dr. 
Geis stated that he did not think that during three 
months and ten days a piece of gauze of the size 
claimed by the plaintiff would ulcerate into the 
intE'stinal tube; that if it had been left in the 
abdon1en, peritonitis would have followed; that 
plaintiff would haYE' died or would have been at 
death 's door. Dr. Riach testified that if such 
sponge had been left as claimed, general or local 
peritonitis would have followed; that it it had 
ulcerated into the intestines it would not have 
been expelled through the rectum; that it could 
in part have gained entrance to the intestinal 
tract, but that it could not have traveled through 
the large intestines, issuing out of the rectum. 
Defendant's testimony was similar in effect. 
* * * 
''Considering the testimony as a whole, and 
without attempting to state any further details, 
we think that it was a question for the jury to 
determine as to whether or not the sponge or gauze 
was left in plaintiff's abdominal cavity as 
claimed. \V e may summarize the reasons as fol-
lows: First, plaintiff testified that he did not 
insert the gauze into his rectum. Second, the 
testimony indicates that it is unlikely that the 
plaintiff swallowed the gauze. Third, it is not 
claimed that any other operation was performed 
on the plaintiff after the operation in May, 1929, 
and if accordingly it is true, as plaintiff testi-
fied, that he did not insert the gauze or sponge 
as claimed, and if he did not swallow it, the only 
opportunity for the sponge or gauze to get into 
the plaintiff's body existed at the time of the 
operation in May, 1929. Fourth, the plaintiff tes-
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tified that he had continued pains and gripings 
near the place where the operation was performed 
and the regions surrounding it, and his recovery 
from the operation did not proceed in a normal 
way. Fifth, Dr. Keith testified directly that in 
his opinion, under the facts in this case, the 
gauze or sponge in question was left in the plain-
tiff's body at the time of the operation in May, 
1929. Under this evidence, if true, the conclusion 
would, we think, be justified that the plaintiff's 
claim in this case that the gauze in question was 
left in his abdomen during the operation in May, 
1929, was justified, and that conclusion would not 
be based upon any presumptions but upon pure 
matters of fact. It is of course true that it is 
truly wondrous that a sponge of the size in question 
tion can work its way through the large intes-
tines in the manner claimed in the case at bar, and 
yet this is not the first case in which a situation 
similar to that has been presented to the courts, 
as will be noted by examining the cases of Spears 
v. McKinnon, 168 Ark. 357, 270 S. \V. 524; Moore 
v. Ivey (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S. 1N. 283; Akridge 
v. Noble, 114 Ga. 949, 41 S. E. 78. In Ruth v. 
Johnson ( C.C.A.) 172 F. 191, it appears that a 
sponge left in the abdominal cavity had worked 
its way into the ascending colon some two and a 
half to three inches. Counsel for the defendant 
have sought to distinguish the first two of the 
foregowing cases because the subjects of the oper-
ations in those cases were females. We are un-
able to see the distinction. In the Moore Case 
the size of the gauze removed from the plaintiff 
was about eight inches wide to thirty-two or 
thirty-four inches in length. 
* * * * * * * 
"While we do not believe that it would be wise 
in the interests of society to require too exacting 
a care of a profession which is, has been, and will 
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be, of untold benefit to humanity, still we cannot 
lay down a rule that the jury must, necessarily, 
accept the testimony of the operating surgeon and 
the nurses and ignore the circumstances shown 
in a case, for that would mean that recovery 
would be practically made im·possible in every 
case. And we think that under the evidence in 
this case as outlined above, the question of due 
care was not a question of law, but was one for 
the jury to decide, subject, of course, to the ordi-
nary right of the trial judge in such cases. We 
have not deemed it necessary to decide whether 
or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be 
applied in a case of this character." 
McCormick v Jones, 132 Wash. 508, 278 Pac. 181. 
Plaintiff was a government employee at Puget 
Sound X avy Yard. He had an injury which resulted in 
fracture of the fifth lumbar vertebrae. He was treated 
at the government hospital and thereafter sent by the 
U. S. Employee's Comp. Commission to defendant; in 
the meantime he had gone to numerous other physicians 
for relief. Defendant recommended a bone transplant 
operation to immobilize the back. He made an incision, 
removed the portions of the bone that had been fractured, 
making a gutter in the spine and then made a bone graft. 
During the course of the operation a sudden hemorrhage 
developed and sponges were used. Through some inad-
vertance a sponge was left. Thereafter the sponge was 
removed. 
A verdict for defendant was reversed. In reversing 
the case the following is said as to the law: 
51 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''On the question of negligence we think little 
need be said. We think all of the witnesses who 
testified on the subject on both sides admitted 
that the leaving of the S'ponge in the wound was 
was negligence. We also think that the court can 
say as a matter of law that when a surgeon inad-
vertently introduces into a wound a foreign sub-
stance, closes up the wound, leaving that foreign 
substance in the body, there being no possibility 
of any good purpose resulting therefrom, that act 
constitutes negligence. A fair reading of the 
testimony of all of the medical experts called on 
this case leads to that conclusion. 
"We do not believe that the minds of reason-
able men differ on this subject, and that a mere 
statement of the facts conclusively shows negli-
gence, and that appellant, being the head surgeon 
in charge of this operation, is responsible there-
for. If the jury, therefore, found for respondent 
on the ground of no negligence, the appellant is 
entitled to a new trial." 
In addition to the above cases we cite, without quot-
ing from, the following cases which are in point in 
principle: 
Ybarra Y. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d-486, 154 Pac. 2 687. 
Reinhold v. Spencer, 53 Ida. 688, 26 Pac. 2d 796. 
JYiorrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 Pac. 2d 590. 
Daly Y. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 288 Pac. 633. 
Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 Pac. 2d 409. 
In the last above named case the California Supreme 
Court used some very pertinent language: 
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'' • "' * 'Ye have already held upon authority that 
the failure to remove a sponge from the abdomen 
of a patient is negligence of the ordinary type and 
that it does not involve knowledge of materia 
medica or surgery but that it belongs to that class 
of mental lapses 'vhich frequently occur in the 
usual routine of business and commerce, and in 
the multitude of commonplace affairs which come 
"ithin the group of ordinary actionable negli-
gence. The layman needs no scientific enlighten-
ment to see at once that the omission can be 
accounted for on no other theory than that some 
one has committed actionable negligence.'' 
These decisions do not differ materially from prin-
ciples recognized by this court as applicable in sponge 
cases but not applied in the decided cases where no such 
facts were involved. 
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 Pac. 2d 257. 
Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 Pac. 2d 712. 
Counsel states, however, that the two motions should 
have been granted because the evidence in the case brings 
us within principles announced in Tremelling v. South-
ern Pacific R.R. Co. and two other cases cited. 
Counsel states that this court has held in those cases 
that when a wrong or injury has been brought about 
from one or the other of two occurrences, either one of 
which may have been the sole proximate cause, and the 
defendant in the case is or could be responsible for one 
only, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence, before he is entitled to have the case submitted 
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to a jury, that the defendant's wrong was the sole proxi-
mate cause. He cites, as authority for that broad state-
ment Tremelling v. Southern Pacific, 51 Utah 189; 170 
Pac. 80 and Edd v. U. P. Coal Co., 25 Utah 293, 71 Pac. 
215; and Reid v. S.P.L.A. & S.L. R.R., 39 Utah 617, 118 
Pac. 1029. 
Those cases are not authority for any such propo-
sition. 
If we understand counsels statement corectly it is 
that a defendant, by showing another possible cause of 
the injury or wrong, thereby takes the case from the 
jury and make's it mandatory on the trial court to grant 
a non-suit or direct a verdict. 
Or perhaps he means that it then becomes incumbent 
on the trial judge to determine where the preponderance 
of the evidence lies and submit the case to the jury only 
in the event the judge believes that the evidence pre-
ponderates in favor of plaintiff. 
On the other hand he might mean that it is the duty 
of this court to say where the preponderance of the 
evidence is. 
In every case the plaintiff' must ·prove his case by 
a preponderance of the evidence. It is for the jury to 
decide whether he has done so. 
In the Tremelling case there was no evidence as to 
how the deceased met his death. Nor was there any 
evidence from which inferences might be drawn as to the 
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cau~e of the injury. The only evidence was that .the 
deceased was found near the track, dead. The theory of 
plaintiff \Yas that deceased struck a freight car on the 
~idetrack but there were no 1narks on the car showing 
such to be the fact. In the absence of such evidence it 
wa~ just as probable that the deceased fell and hit the 
ground as it was that he hit the freight car. 
One would assume fron1 the case that if there had 
been evidence of marks on the freight car there would 
then have been a case for jury determination because it 
could then haYe been inferred that he hit the car. Such 
an inference from factual evidence is what is known as 
circumstantial evidence. 
\Vhere facts are established by competent evidence 
from which inferences may be drawn that defendant com-
mitted the wrong or caused the injury, the case goes to 
the jury even through there may be direct evidence to the 
contrary. Courts and text writers have uniformly held 
that circumstantial evidence may be, and often is, more 
convincing in establishing the truth than direct evidence. 
It simply presents a conflict in the evidence for the 
trier of the fcts to determine. 
The holding of the Tremelling case is not fairly set 
forth in counsel's quotation. The whole opinion is based 
upon the following statement: 
'' If there had been no frost on the standing car, 
which of necessity must have been disturbed in 
case any person, object, or thing came in contact 
therewith, there would be at least some basis for 
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the inference contended for by plaintiff. Where, 
however, as in this case, the inference is based 
upon an assumed or supposed fact, which fact the 
evidence shows did not exist, then the inference 
is left without support. * * * It must not be 
assumed, however, that the rule thus stated can 
be given general application. Indeed, the rule 
can rarely be applied, since the evidence generally 
is such that it is the exclusive province of the jury 
to draw the inference therefrom. The case at bar, 
however, presents a typical case where the rule is 
applicable. Here the plaintiff relies entirely upon 
an assumed fact, namely, that the deceased came 
in contact with the freight car which was standing 
on the side track. The witnesses produced both 
by the plaintiff and the defendant, however, all 
agree that the car standing on the side track was 
covered all over with a thick coating of frost; 
that any person, object, or substance touching the 
car at any point or place interfered with the coat-
ing of frost and disturbed it so that is was easily 
seen by any one that some one or something had 
come in contact with the car; that after careful 
examination, lasting a considerable length of time, 
no mark of any kind was discovered indicating 
that any one or anything had come in contact with 
the car at any point, and that experiments were 
made to determine whether, if any one or any-
thing of substance had touched the frosting on 
the car, evidence of the fact would appear in the 
frosting. The assumed fact that the body of the 
deceased came in contact with the car was thus 
clearly, if not conclusively, negatived.'' 
The Tremelling case was considered and its appli-
cability discussed in the case of Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad v. Ind. Comm., 66 Utah 494, 243 Pac. 
800. Mr. Justice Frick, who wrote the Tremelling deci-
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sion, was still a Inember of this eourt and eoneurred in 
this later deeision. The facts are interesting. The em-
ployee testified that he hit himself on the knee with a 
hammer; that there was a bruise, pain, diseloration and 
swelling. The doetor diagnosed it as rheumatism. Two 
weeks later he was sent to the hospital where an abseess 
developed. Fron1 this the hip beeame infeeted. He then 
became totally disabled. It also developed in the evidenee 
that two or three months prior to the injury he had some 
boils 'Yhich had entirely healed up and disappeared. 
Cpon this proposition there was a eonfliet in the 
opinion of the doetors as to whether the aecident caused 
the infection in the hip or whether the infection in the 
hip came from the boils. 
The Industrial Commission, trier of the faets, found 
the issues in favor of the employee. On appeal it was 
argued that the case came within the principle announeed 
in the Tremelling case. This court said that it did not 
and that there was substantial evidence to support the 
decision of the trier of the facts and that the finding 
could not disturbed on appeal. Here is what this court 
said, in that case, "'ith reference to the applieability of 
the Tremelling case to that faetual situation. 
'' The reasons why the rule invoked can have no 
appliation to the case at bar are elearly set forth 
in James v. Robertson, 117 P. 1068, 1072, 39 Utah 
414, at page 438, where Frick, C. J., speaking for 
the court, said : 
'' 'That doctrine applies only where the plain-
tiff's evidence, when considered alone, has such 
an effect, or when the jury finds the evidence 
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equally balanced, and not, as apvpellant's counsel 
seems to contend, when all of the evidence pro-
duced by both sides, some of which is in dispute, 
is capable of such a construction. The reason the 
rule is not applicable in the latter event is obvious. 
There is no law which binds a jury to believe any 
of the defendant's evidence which conflict with 
that of the plaintiff. The doctrine, therefore, 
ordinarily cannot apply in cases of conflicting 
evidence.' 
"Again, at page 429 (117 P. 1073): 
" 'The law is not that a plaintiff must fail in 
case the injury of which he complains might have 
been caused- that is, that there was a possibility 
that it was caused- by some cause or causes for 
which the defendant was not responsible, but he 
must fail only when it is just as probable from the 
evidence adduced by the plaintiff, or in case the 
evidence is equally balanced, that the inj11;ry was 
produced by some cause for which the defendant 
was not responsible, as it is that it was produced 
by a cause for which he was.' 
''The evidence in behalf of the employee in 
the case at bar was not open to two inferences of 
equal probability as to the cause of his disability. 
The evidence of the fact of injury, following by 
the abscess in the knee, which in turn was fol-
lowed by the infection, by the same kind of bac-
teria, of the hip joint, together with expert opin-
ion evidence that the latter resulted from tht> 
former, is substantial evidence and a 'satisfactory 
foundation' for the finding that the injury was 
the cause of the disability. See Murray City v. 
Ind. Com., 183 P. 331, 55 Utah 44; Bingham 
Mines Co. v. Allsop, 203 P. 644, 59 Utah 306; 
Milford Copper Co. v. Ind. Com., 210 P. 993, 61 
Utah 37." 
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Again, in 'V ard v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, 96 Utah 564, 85 Pac. 2nd 837, this 
court states: 
'' Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Co., 51 Utah 
189, 200, 170 Pac. 80, \Yas a case not where there 
were equal inferences as is sometimes mistakenly 
said, but there was no basis for any inferences. 
If there is a basis for two or more inferences the 
ju,ry must decide which is the correct one. The 
evidence in this case presents a basis for finding 
negligence and a basis from which it may be in-
ferred that the negligence caused death.'' 
Recently the problem of two conflicting inferences 
was discussed in Southern Pacific Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 96 Utah 510, 87 Pac. 2d 811 : 
''On the other hand, the commission might 
have found that death was due to natural causes. 
But where there is evidence from which two con-
flicting inferences might reasonably be drawn, 
this court should not reverse a decision of the 
commission which adopts what appears to be the 
more probable of the two. Columbia Steel Co. V-
Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P. 2d 124. 
vVhere there is no basis for an inference as to 
how death was caused or, put as it has been put, 
but rather inaccurately, that where there are in 
law equal inferences, as in the case of Tremelling 
v. Southern Pacific Company, 51 Utah 189, 170 
P. 80, affirmed in 70 Utah 72, 257 P. 1066, the 
jury 0annot be permitted to supply the link be-
tween the fact of a dead body found in a certain 
position and the cause of the death by a guess as 
to how it occurred. But where there is a basis for 
some reasonable inferences as to how the death 
was caused, and it cannot be said in law that a 
reasonable man could not choose one deduction 
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from the underlying facts as against another, the 
finding of the jury will be upheld." 
See also Lym v. Thompson, 112 Utah 24, 184 Pac. 
2d 667. The question was as to who stole the steel 
tubing. Defendant admitted purchasing 38. rrhere was 
direct evidence, in conflict with that evidence, that he 
took 63. There were originally 119 tubes and all of 
them disappeared about that time. Defendant estab-
lished that there were holes in the fence and that others 
could get in. Who did it~ The trial court said defend-
ant did, notwithstanding the inference that others might 
have had access to the yard where it was stored. This 
was based entirely on circumstantial evidence in the 
face of the conflicting inference created by defendant's 
evidence. Here is what this court said with reference 
to the finding of the trial court : 
''The well reasoned case of New York Life 
Ins Co. v .l\IcN eely, 52 Ariz. 181, 79 P.ac. 2d 948, 
sets down the rule governing the use of circum-
stantial evidence in civil cases which we deem 
sound and will apply to the evidence here. 52 
Ariz. 181, 79 Pac. 2d at page 954. 
'' 'In civil cases, involving only property 
rights * * ,z, it is sufficient, if the ultimate fact is 
to be determined by an inference from facts 
which are established by direct evidence, that it 
be more probable than any other inference which 
could be drawn from the facts thus proven.' * * * 
But, the lower oourt htls seen fit to reject de-
·fendant's version of the case and the question 
for us to decide is not which of the two sides 
should be believed. We are called upon to de-
cide whether or not there is evidence in the case 
that will directly or by inference support the 
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dec1"siou of the trier of the facts. In deciding that 
question 1ce decide merely-so far as circumstan-
tial evidence is concerned-that if there are in-
ferences to be drmcn therefrom that will ,-..·uppm·t 
the lower court's conclusions upon the probabil-
ities of that e·vidence, we are bou.nd to uphold 
the decision, even though had we been trying 
the case we might l~ave stressed the inferences 
adt·e rsely to such a conclusion. We have shown 
above how there are inferences that will sup-
port the lower court's conclusion and therefore 
we must affirm it. It is so ordered." 
This court also considered the Tremelling opinion 
in a malpractice case, viz. Peterson v. Richards, 73 Utah 
59, :27:2 Pac. :229. The plaintiff claimed that her fin-
gers were pinched while she was on the operating table, 
under defendant's control. She showed that her fin-
gers were uninjured when she went under the anes-
thetic. About 45 minutes after coming out of the anes-
thetic in her hospital room she found that her hand 
"·as injured. Her fingers had been pinched and crushed. 
Defendant contended that they could have been 
crushed in the hospital bed and produced evidence that 
it was more probable that it could occur in the hospital 
bed than the operating table. In fact he had the oper-
ating table in the court room, before the jury, and tried 
to demonstrate that a person's fingers simply could not 
get caught in the operating table. 
But the jury didn't believe that evidence. 
Plaintiff rested her case entirely on circumstan-
Hal evidence, as she had to do, as against the positive 
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denial of defendant and the purported inference that 
she might have gotten her finger caught in the hospital 
\bed. 
There, as here, defendant said the trial court should 
fu.ave directed a verdict on the basis of the Tremelling 
case and the Reid case, both cited by defendant as au-
thority here. This court refused to reverse the ruling 
of the trial court in submitting the case to the jury and 
sustained the verdict. in these words : 
"Upon this evidence it is the contention that 
the plaintiff failed to prove that her fingers were 
injured on or about the operating table or while 
she was being opera ted on and as in her com-
plaint alleged; that on the evidence it is mere 
conjecture or speculation that her fingers were 
injured in such manner; that on the evidence it 
is just as probable that the injury occurred 
through manipulations or adjustments of the bed 
after the plaintiff was removed from the oper-
ating room as through manipulations or adjust-
ments of the operating table, and that in such 
situation of equal probabilities, or equal probable 
causes, one for which the defendant might be 
responsible and the other not, the case ought to 
have been withheld from the jury. * * * 
''On the evidence adduced on behalf of the 
plaintiff herself, it is not reasonably inferable 
that her injury resulted through manipulations 
or adjustments of the bed. Whatever inference 
in such particular, if any, may be deduced, comes 
from the defendant's evidence. The plaintiff, of 
course, was required to adduce sufficient evidence 
to justify a finding that her fingers were injured 
through manipulations or adjustments of the op-
erating table and as in her complaint alleged. 
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It is not claimed that she was required to prove 
that by direct or positiYe evidence or by the tes-
timony of some on who actually saw the fingers 
pinched or hurt in ~ueh manner. lt is enough if 
facts and circun1stances are proven which rea-
sonably point to the inference that her fingers 
were injured in such n1anner and which are con-
sistent therewtih and not equally consistent with 
an inference that they were injured in some other 
n1anner. * * * 
"It is urged the case is within the rule an-
nounced in the cases of Tremelling v. S. P. Co., 
51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80; Reid v. S. P. L. A. & 
S. L. R. Co., 39 Utah 617, 118 P. 1009, and other 
cases, where it in effect is stated that the plain-
tiff to sustain his cause must prove more than 
a mere conjecture or probability that the injury 
occurred as alleged by him; and that where the 
plaintiff seeks to prove an allegation essential 
to his cause only by an inference or inferences 
sought to be deduced from proven facts and cir-
cumstances, and the evidence so adduced by him 
with equal force points to several inferences or 
causes, one of which rendering the defendant lia-
ble and the other or others not, the plaintiff has 
not sustained his cause by sufficient evidence. 
Such is but familiar doctrine and upon which the 
rule of indirect or cimcumstantial evidence is 
founded. But it here has no application, for on 
the theory of. plaintiff's cause and upon the evi-
dence adduced by her, though indirect or cir-
cumstantial in character, whatever inference or 
inferences may be deduced therefrom point in 
but one direction and are consistent only with 
the inference or inferences that plaintiff's fin-
gers were injured at or about the operating table. 
Whatever inference or inferences, if any, may be 
deduced that the injury occurred in some other 
way or by manipulations or adjustments of the 
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bed, are to be deduced from facts and circum-
stances shown by the defendant and not by the 
plaintiff. The defendant did not by any direct 
or positive evidence show that plaintiff's fin-
gers were injured by manipulations or adjust-
ments of the bed. He but sought such an infer-
ence to be deduced from facts and circumstances 
proven by him and from manipulations of the bed 
before the jury. Of course, throughout the case, 
the plaintiff had the burden of proving by a fair 
preponderance or greater weight of the evidence 
that the injury occurred as alleged by her. 
Whether on all of the evidence she sustained that 
burden was on the record a question for the jury. 
It is not within our province to determine whether 
the injury occurred in the one way or the other, 
or whether it is even more probable that it oc-
curred the one way rather than the other. We 
may only determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence, if believed by the jury, to justify or 
warrant a finding that the injury occurred as 
alleged by the plaintiff. We think the case, on 
the evidence, does not come within the rule con-
tended for by the defendant. James v. Robertson, 
39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068. We are therefore of 
the opinion that the motion for a directed ver-
dict was properly over-ruled.'' 
Counsel also refers to the case of Reid v. S. P. L.A. 
& S. L. R. R. Co., 39 Utah 617, 118 Pac. 1009. A cow 
got onto the right of way and was killed. There was 
an open gate, for the opening and closing of which de-
fendant was not responsible, near the dead cow. About 
a mile away was a break in the fence for the mainten-
ance of which the railroad was responsible. There the 
evidence rested and this court very properly held that 
the jury could not speculate as to whether the cow went 
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I.L: 
1:1 
through the gate, which was more probable, or through 
the fence, which was remote. What would have been the 
situation if the eow had been found near the broken 
fence and in addition the plaintiff had established some 
recent droppings of the cow at or near the broken fence, 
·with additional evidence that no other cow had been 
there to leaYe tlwse droppings? \Y ould the court then 
haYe said that there was no evidence from which the 
jury could have concluded that the cow went through 
the broken fencef 
Under our Constitution guaranteeing to citizens the 
right to a trial by jury and placing the burden of find-
ing the facts upon a jury, courts have been very loathe 
to encroach upon the province of the jury. 
Where there is any substantial evidence to go to 
the jury it must be submitted. And this is true where 
the evidence is conflicting and where several inferences 
may be drawn from the evidence. The general prin-
ciples are set forth in 53 Am. Juris. 147, sec. 164, under 
''Trial,'' as follows: 
''Sufficiency of Evidence.-While as a general 
rule a party is not entitled to the submission of 
the case to the jury unless the evidence is suf-
ficient to warrant a finding in his favor, where 
there is evidence of so positive and significant a 
character as would support a verdict, if uncon-
tradicted, it is the duty of the trial court to sub-
mit the case to the jury. It is the province of the 
jury to determine the weight and sufficiency of 
the evidence when the evidence is conflicting; 
even though it is not conflicting, the court may 
not take the case from the jury when different 
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inferences may be drawn therefrom and when 
there is evidence which will support ·a verdict. 
Some cases hold, moreover, that it is not neces-
sa:r:·y, in order to entitle the plaintiff to go to the 
jury, that his evidence be such as to warrant a 
verdict, but only that the evidence be sufficient 
to present to the jury a question of fact.'' 
See also Sec. 158 of the same text : 
"Questions of Fact.-In a case being tried by 
a jury the court should not undertake to pass on 
and decide issues of fact. The jury's function has 
as definite sanction as that of the court. The 
controlling functions of a jury are to pronounce 
on the credibility of witnesses; to determine dis-
puted facts; to draw conclusions from doubtful 
and contradictory premises; and to admeasure 
damages where the law has afforded no standard. 
It is the province of the jury to hear the evidence 
and by their verdict to settle the issues of fact, 
no matter what the state of the evidence. Where 
different conclusions may reasonably be drawn 
by different minds from the same evidence, the 
question is ordinarily one for the jury. This is 
true not only where the uncertainty is caused by 
a substantial conflict in the testimony, but also 
where the facts are undisputed but are such that 
different conclusions may reasonably be drawn 
from them. But it is only where different minds 
may draw different conclusions from evidence of 
a fact in issue that a question for the jury is pre-
sented. The issue presented by the invoeation of 
the rule against creation of unfair prejudice in 
favor of one person to an action, by the intro-
duction of evidence, is one of fact.'' 
There is practically no conflict in the authorities on 
this proposition. The cases are annotated in the Digest 
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Sy~tem under subdivision 142 .. Trials" so far as they 
relate to inferences to be drawn from the evidence as 
affecting- the right of the court to grant a motion for 
non-suit or directed verdict. 
Utah has several cases on this subject. It would 
unduly lengthen this brief to give them all. We cite 
only a few of the many. 
Anderson v. ~ ixon, 104 Utah 262; 139 Pac. 2d 216: 
"':Jledicine not being an exact science, it is 
not necessary that the proximate cause of an in-
jury sustained through the negligence of a doctor 
be proved with exactitude. It is enough if there 
is substantial evidence to support the judgment. 
Reynolds v. Struble, 128 Cal. App. 716, 18 P. 2d 
690. If the injury sustained could be attributed 
to two or more causes, one of which was the neg-
ligence of the doctor, it would be a question for 
the jury to determine which was the proximate 
cause of the injury." 
Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 100 Utah 120, 
110 Pac. (2d) 566: 
''At the outset we may remark that it is well 
settled in this state that we are bound by the 
findings of fact of the trial court, if there is any 
substantial evidence to maintain them (Brittain 
v. Gorman, 42 Utah 586, 133 P. 370), and that 
where a finding is based upon sufficient evidence 
we will not reverse it, even if we are inclined 
to arrive at a different conclusion than the trial 
judge. Fee v. National Bank, 37 Utah 28, 106 
P. 517. 
* * 
"It is of course true that where opinion evi-
dence flies in the face of uncontroverted physical 
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facts also in evidence that the opinion must give 
way to the fact, and that the opinions of witnesses 
are not properly admissible where the issue may 
be resolved by persons of common knowledge and 
understanding who have possession of the facts. 
Ruping v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 51 Utah 
480, 171 P. 145. 
* * * 
''Accordingly, we conclude that the questioned 
findings of the trial court as to the cause of death 
of the deseased insured is sustained by the evi-
dence, and we may not interfere with such find-
ing.'' 
Carpenter v. Syrett, 99 Utah 208, 104 Pac. 2d 617: 
''Where different conclusions may be reason-
ably drawn by different minds from the same 
evidence, the decision must be left to the jury. 
McStay v. Citizens' National Trust & Savings 
Bank of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. App. 2d 595, 43 P. 
2d 560; Pollard v. Broadway Central Hotel Cor-
poration, 353 Ill. 312, 187 N. E. 487. And as said 
by this court in Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37 
Utah 520, 109 P. 817, 820: 'If the evidence and 
the inferences are of the character which would 
authorize reasonable men to arrive at different 
conclusions with respect to whether all the essen-
tial facts were or were not proven, the question 
is one of fact and not of law. This is so although 
the evidence on some points may be very unsat-
isfactory or doubtful.' '' 
Spackman v. Benefit Ass 'n, 97 Utah 91, 89 Pac. 2d 
490: 
"In so far as external appearances were con-
cerned witnesses described the lesion or injury 
as having the appearance of, or being like, the 
'bite of an insect or sting of a bee'. Three lay 
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,. 
witnesses so testified. This was the expression 
of an opinion or a descriptive appearance con-
stituting a generalization of matters of common 
kno·wledge. X o other description or explanation 
\Yas offered. 
"X egatiYely, it was said the lesion did not 
have the appearance of a pimple or boil. The 
physicians ventured the opinion that it would be 
impossible to determine from the descriptions 
giYen what the cause of the infection was. No 
other or different explanation or theory of the 
origin of the infection was suggested or given 
than that it was like a bite of an insect or bee 
sting. Two witnesses testified there was an open-
ing in the center of the leison. The doctor, who 
examined it and treated it, said he did not see 
such opening. That was a matter for the jury. 
* * * 
"We think the evidence sufficient to require 
us to say we cannot disturb the verdict as it was 
based upon a permissible inference from the evi-
dence properly submitted.'' 
Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320; 81 Pac. 
2d 359: 
"If there was any substantial evidence from 
which the jury could find that John Crus gave 
this money to the defendant, Anne Crus, during 
his lifetime then the court erred in directing a. 
verdict for the plaintiff. In Papanikolas v. Samp-
son, 73 Utah 404, 274 P. 856, this court said (page 
863) : 'If there was any substantial evidence upon 
which the jury could find for the plaintiffs under 
the pleadings, the court erred in directing the 
veridct.' And in Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37 
Utah 520, 109 P. 817, the court said (page 820): 
'The test is whether or not there is some sub-
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stantial evidence in support of every essential 
fact which a plaintiff is required to prove in 
order to entitle him to recover. If the evidence 
and the inferences are of the charcter which 
would authorize reasonable men to arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions with respect to whether all 
essential facts were or were not proven, then the 
question is one of fact and not of law.' And in 
Green v. 1-Iigbee, 66 Utah 539, 244 P. 906, the 
court said (page 908) : 'A verdict should not be 
directed for defendant, unless all reasonable men 
would draw the same conclusion from the evi-
dence, and that conclusion would require a ver-
dict for the defendant.' To the same effect, see 
Nelson v. Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 P. 2d 292." 
Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 Pac. 2d 1: 
"Where two or more inferences may be 
drawn even from uncontradicted evidence, it is 
still a matter for the fact finder. Such is not the 
case where the facts are not disputed and only 
one inference may be made. In that case it would 
be incumbent upon the court to apply the law 
to the uncontested fact and in a jury trial direct 
a verdict. ' ' 
Now let us take a look at the evidence on this sub-
ject matter. Plaintiff's evidence, brought out on cross-
examination without objection, shows that all of her 
rear molars were extracted many years ago-twenty to 
thirty years, when she was a young woman. One of 
the dentists who may have extracted one or more of 
those teeth was a Dr. Morgan, now deceased. Her den-
tist since 1935 has been Dr. Wright of Murray, Utah. 
When Mrs. Fredrickson's deposition was taken she 
was asked as to any teeth that had been pulled and 
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when. She said the rear nwlars. upper and lower, were 
pulled twenty or thirty years ago; that Dr. Wright 
might haYe pulled two or three teeth (not molars) after 
1935 or maybe he didn't pull any. \Vhen Dr. Wright 
was on the stand he produced his records showing that 
he pulled no teeth for the plaintiff until January 1946 
(all front teeth); used no gauze or sponges in her mouth; 
and that his work prior to that time consisted of clean-
ing her teeth and filling a few cavities. 
Upon this evidence counsel says that Dr. Morgan 
is the one who left the gauze packs in her throat, or that 
it is equally probable that he did do so; hence, he says, 
the case should have been taken from the jury. 
The only evidence is that the rear molars were 
pulled twenty or thirty years ago and that Dr. Morgan 
was one of the dentists who extracted one or more of 
them. This is all that the evidence shows. 
Upon these two facts counsel says that the trial 
court should have taken the case from the jury. He 
asked the trial court to make the following inferences 
upon inferences: (1) That two of the rear molars ex-
tracted twenty or thirty years ago were dry sockets 
or bleeders; and upon that inference to make the fur-
ther inference that the dentist or dentists (either Dr. 
Morgan or someone else) packed the sockets with gauze 
packs; and upon those inferences infer that he or they 
left two packs in the sockets; and upon those inferences 
to infer that, if they were lower molars, that such packs 
either moved in mass through the jawbone into the 
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throat; or that such hypothetical packs, if left in the 
lower molars, moved upwards out of the sockets (which 
they say it couldn't do) into the mouth and then re-
entered the mouth tissue and moved in mass to the 
tonsil area; or as an alternate to this hypothesis that it 
wasn't two lower molars at all but two rear upper 
molars and that two such packs, inferred to have been 
used, inferred to have been left, and inferred to have 
remained there for twenty or thirty years without any 
one knowing about it, came out of the upper sockets 
into the mouth, reentered the mouth tissue in mass and 
then moved in mass downward to the tonsil area; or 
perhaps he suggests that it moved laterally out through 
the jaw bone encasing the socket. More than that he is 
asking the court, in order to erect this straw man~o 
infer that two such packs were left, one on either side, 
and that after twenty or thirty years of having been 
imbedded as two masses of cotton gauze in her teeth, 
without her knowledge or any infectious manifestations 
of their presence for such a long period of time, that 
they finally arrived at the tonsil area simultaneously 
just at the psychological moment to appear as lump~ 
in her throat and become gatherers and spreaders of 
infection immediately following Dr. Maw's operation. 
And this in spite of the evidence of Mrs. Fredrickson, 
Betty Fredrickson, Mrs. Mathews and Mrs. Rupp that 
it was gauze that came out of her throat. It certainly I 'i1 
retained its form and texture for a long time if it had 
come out of tooth sockets and been in her throat for 
twenty or thirty years. 
72 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Xot even Dr. ~law's loyal professiOnal friends sug-
gested any such nonsense. It was not even testified to 
by Dr. :J[aw. The latter took two positions. In the first 
place he said it wasn't g·auze at all but undigested food 
matter. The City Chen1ist ans\Yered that proposition 
and Dr. :Jiaw hirnself finally admitted (R. 470) that it 
was cotton threads but said it wasn't the kind he used. 
He then said her dentists were responsible but didn't 
say how. That was ans\\·ered by I\Irs. Fredrickson and 
:Jlr. Fredrickson who testified that no gauze packs had 
ever been used in her mouth by any dentist and by Dr. 
\Y right and Dr. Browning themselves. 
Counsel would have all of these inferences rest one 
upon the other without a word of evidence to support 
them, and yet he says that this wholly imaginary setup, 
purely a figment of counsel's imagination, was suffi-
cient to destroy the case against Dr. Maw. 
It will be noted that defendant did not request the 
trial court to give any instruction to the jury upon 
any such absurd theory. In the presentation of evidence 
he was given the widest latitude to try to develop a 
solid basis for such a theory if he could do so but, when 
he got through, all he had was the fact that the rear 
teeth had been pulled twenty or thirty years ago. Dr. 
:Jiaw himself said that prior to his operation her throat 
was normal, without evidence of prior surgery and that 
she showed no abonmal throat condition. He even ex-
amined her sinus and found it clear. 
What a fertile imagintion counsel has, when he 
can build all of this upon the one fact that plaintiff had 
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had her rear molars pulled twenty or thirty years ago 
and that one of her earlier dentists was named Dr. Mor-
gan. When they have to hang their hat on that one nail, 
driven into nothing more substantial than counsel's 
vivid imagination as to inferences upon inferences as 
to what he imagines might have occurred twenty or 
thirty years ago, they have a weak basis for asking 
this court to apply the doctrine of the Tremelling case, 
or any other case. 
Counsel for defendant has quoted copiously from 
the evidence of defendant and his witnesses on issues 
where there was a conflict between the direct and 
opinion evidence of defendant and the circumstantial 
evidence of plaintiff. The jury resolved that conflict in 
the evidence against defendant and yet he quotes such 
evidence as though it were established facts in the case. 
A good example of this is the statement of defend-
ant and his witnesses that a piece of gauze placed in 
the tonsil fossa could not remain there longer than a 
few days-not over thirty days-and certainly not 
longer than sixty days. In fact two of defendant's ex-
perts, Dr. Snow and Dr. Cleary, stated that if two 
pieces of gauze exuded from the two points indicated 
by Dr. Dolowitz in plaintiff's throat on the dates indi-
cated, to-wit, June 26, 1948, and November 15, 1948, 
that in their opinion they had to have been placed in 
the throat of plaintiff at those same places not over 
thirty-and certainly not over sixty-days prior to 
their emission. This was in conflict with the established 
fact that there had been no surgery in her throat since 
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the tonsillectomy. In expressing this opiniOn the doc-
tors completely overlooked the fact that for more than 
thirty days or even sixty days prior to those dates she 
had been under the eonstant observation and treatment 
of Dr. Dolowitz who did no surgery in her throat be-
yond the taking of biopsies which loosened the gauze so 
that it could come out and disclose the cause of the 
trouble that had been infecting her throat and causing 
fear of cancer since the date of the tonsillectomy. 
Counsel completely disregards the direct evidence 
that no one but Dr. Maw had ever performed surgery 
in her throat before or after the tonsillectomy. 
He completely disregards the admissions of his 
own experts on cross-examination that the tonsil fossa 
can be shallow or deep, as much as 5/8ths of an inch 
in normal cases and as much as 3/4ths of an inch in 
diseased cases; that the tonsils rest in a deep red sac; 
and that in cases of imbedded tonsils the incision can 
go into the tissue outside of and beyond the tonsil fossa; 
and that there is also a practice of some physicians in 
cases of excessive bleeding to suture a gauze pack in 
the tonsil fossa and remove it later, which practice is 
rejected and ''damned'' by the medical profession, but 
which is nevertheless sometimes done. 
He also completely disregards the fact that while 
defendant and his experts said packs of gauze in the 
throat will not remain longer than thirty or sixty days 
so far as doctors are concerned, he nevertheless argues 
that they remain there for twenty or thirty years if a 
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dentist is to be the victim. Juries don't have to believe 
such evidence-and this one did not. 
It is no wonder the jury, and particularly the juror 
Emery, did not believe such sophistry. 
When Drs. Snow and Cleary said that these masses 
of cotton threads had to have been placed in plaintiff's 
throat not over thirty-and certainly not over sixty-
days prior to the dates of emission from the ulcers in 
plaintiff's throat, they manifested a magnificent example 
of how far they were willing to go in their professional 
loyalty to a brother in distress, but they thereby con-
demned their evidence to disbelief in the light of the 
positive evidence of everyone, including Dr. Dolowitz 
who had had plaintiff under treatment since May 10, 
1948, that no such thing had occurred; hence their tes-
timony that it, medically, had to have occurred within 
thirty or sixty days was not believed by the jury, and 
properly so. It was contrary to the established facts, 
and unbelievble. 
And yet counsel, in the face of this, states as a fact 
that Dr. Maw couldn't have left the gauze there be-
cause it wouldn't have remained over a few days if he 
had. He completely ignores the conflicting evidence 
that it did happen and did remain. 
Counsel also makes much of the fact that the ulcerR 
from which the gauze exuded was not directly on the 
tonsil area. The ulcers from which the gauze finally 
exuded were the last ulcers, excepting some minor ones 
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fron1 which threads were still coming out practically to 
the tin1e of trial. He completely ignores the evidence 
that her throat was sore and ulcerated at different 
points during the "Whole period from the date of the 
tonsillectomy, some of which ulcers were right in the 
tonsil hole. They would come and go, only to reappear 
or appear in different places. The infection spread 
throughout her entire mouth. 
Infection, as stated by Dr. Dolowitz, is a result of 
bacteria breaking down the healthy tissue and the pres-
sure of nature causes foreign material to seek a way 
out through openings made by ulcers. Of course when 
the biopsies were taken by Dr. Dolowitz the capsulated 
condition was relieved and they appered on the surface 
where the enlarged opening was made by him. He RO 
testified. 
It isn't a question of where the gauze packs and 
threds came out. They migrate with the infection and 
pressure. The question is, where did they go in and 
who put them there~ That was a jury question under 
the conflicting evidence, both direct and circumstantial. 
Malpractice cases are not few, even in this jurisdie-
tion. ~[ost of them involve diagnosis and treatment 
"·here expert evidence is necessary to sustain a judg-
ment. This is not such a case. No expert evidence is 
required in cases involving the leaving of a sponge or 
piece of gauze in the body of a patient, in the absence 
of some showing that the operation was of such char-
acter as to require it. No such issue is involved here. 
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The leaving of gauze or sponges in this case was not 
attempted to be justified. It was condemned as an im-
proper practice. The only defense attempted to be pre-
sented was that Mr. Maw didn't do it. 
On that issue a doctor stands before the court and 
jury the same as any other defendant who says he didn't 
do a thing for which he is charged, but the evidence 
says that he did. 
In malpractice cases of this kind not involving or 
calling for expert evidence, it is not uncommon for the 
doctor to say that he didn't do it; that he couldn't have 
left the sponge because he put hemostats on his sponges 
or that he counted them; or that the negligence was that 
of the nurses, or some assistant; or that some other 
doctor had attended the patient before or after the 
operation who also could have left the sponge; or that 
the patient was sick anyway and the same thing would 
have occurred even if he had removed the sponge; or 
that there are many causes that could have contributed 
to the result . 
.All of these cases have to rest more or less on cir-
cumstantial evidence. The patient doesn't know what 
actually occurred. Usually she is unconscious or so 
situated that she can't see. She wouldn't know if she 
could see, because surgery is something that she wouldn't 
know about, whether it was proper or improper. A 
patient wouldn't know how deep or how extensive the 
incision was, or should be ; whether the tonsil was im-
bedded and the incision went beyond the tonsil fossa; 
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or whether there were gauze packs sutured in the in-
cision. They are simply told what to do and when to come 
back. They follow their instructions. In the meantime 
scar tissue forms over the incision and all they know 
is that they are sick; that it feels like there is a lump 
in their throat; that ulcers form and the mouth is sore 
everywhere from the infection; they are fed endless 
doses of sulfa and penicillin to control or eliminate the 
infection; and eventually the gauze is exuded and heal-
ing takes place. They know that only one doctor has 
worked where the gauze is found. They must prove 
their case by circumstantial evidence. In the cases cited 
above the courts have held that when the patient has 
done that in this kind of a case it is for the jury to say 
whether the doctor did it. 
Counsel says that it was incumbent on plaintiff to 
show that the pieces of gauze migrated from the tonsil 
fossa to the places of emission. There was no such 
burden on plaintiff. Her burden was to show where it 
went in and who did it. She carried this burden and 
excluded, by her evidence, all other probable sources. 
No one other than Dr. Maw performed any surgery in 
her throat, before of since. She did not know what Dr. 
Maw did. She did not know whether he found imbedded 
tonsils and went beyond the tonsil area or whether 
he got excessive bleeding and sutured the gauze in as a 
temporary measure, intending to remove it later, and 
then forgot to do so; or whether it was some pieces that 
got caught in the suturing and then got covered over 
with scar tissue. A patient never knows what a doctor 
does. She did know that he made an incision and used 
79 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
gauze sponges and sutures and that she had a lump in 
her throat immediately afterwards at the place of oper-
ation, and that from then on to the time the pieces of 
gauze came out she had ulcers and abscesses in her 
throat, some of which were right in the hole of the tonsil. 
Infection spread throughout her mouth and throat. Dr. 
Dolowitz testified that the gauze was the source of 
infection. It was, therefore, a question of who put the 
gauze in there. Counsel makes much of the marks placed 
on exhibit 1 (the enlarged diagram of the mouth) by 
Dr. Dolowitz. Prior to the exuding of the gauze through 
ulcers at the points indicated, plaintiff's mouth and 
throat had ulcers at other places, including right in 
the tonsil hole. The tonsil pillars do not define the size 
of the fossa. As stated by Dr. Snow (R. 425) there may 
be only a small part of the tonsil showing within the 
pillars. The tonsils may be large, in which case, of 
course, the fossa are larger than the extremeties of the 
pillars. They may even extend through the fossa into 
the tissue beyond. 
When Mrs. Frederickson established by her evidence 
that Dr. Maw was the only one who used gauze sponges 
there and immediately afterward she had a lump in 
her throat which finally turned out to be gauze sponges, 
there is certainly more than a fair inference that de-
fendant put them there. 
There is no dispute that these pieces of gauze caused 
ulcers, abscesses and sores right from the start, exactly 
as the doctors said they should. They also said that 
infection caused the ulcers and abscesses and that pres-
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sure of nature in trying to expel the foreign body caused 
them to moYe. In addition we must remember that Dr. 
Dolowitz had taken several biopsies from those areas 
which caused them to come out where he had made the 
openings. 
At page 62 of counsel's brief is a statement which 
we challenge. He says, ''The nearest ulcers were but 
1 to 2 inches distant from the tonsil fossae.'' Counsel 
gives no reference to the record in making that state-
ment. There is no such evidence. On the contrary the 
record is replete with evidence that the ulcers were 
occurring right in the tonsil area-in fact right in the 
hole of the tonsil. We give the following page refer-
ences: Mrs. Fredrickson: R. 99, 104, 108, 110, 111, 112, 
146, 147, 148. Read the record as to where the ulcers 
were. 
Dr. Dolowitz was asked by counsel for defendants 
to place on Exhibit 1 (an enlarged illustration of the 
mouth-not Mrs. Fredrickson's mouth) the location of 
the ulcers from which the two gauze sponges and several 
thread were exuded. He did not see the gauze sponges 
come out. The ulcers had been enlarged by his biopsies. 
He stated very candidly that in placing the marks on 
the illustration he was just giving an approximation (R. 
202). He was testifying from memory with the aid of 
his notes. He first testified that the left ulcer was about 
midway between the anterior pillar of the tonsil and 
the last upper tooth (R. 186-190). He then said it was 
closer to the tooth. Later he testified that on October 
25, 1948 he found this ulcer healing ''just lateral to the 
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fossa" (R. 191). As to the right ulcer he testified that 
he found two lesions, ''there was a slightly healing of 
the wounds, what type I couldn't testify, on the right side 
over the tonsil area'' ( R. 191), midway between the 
right anterior pillar and the last tooth. He was asked to 
read his notes on what he found on the right side on 
November 15, 1948 (R. 507). They are as follows: 
"Patient comes in reporting that on the 8th 
of November a large mass of material sluffed 
out of the right side of the throat at the pole of 
the tonsil slightly backward, that is my way of 
putting it, slightly behind the pole area, 'and 
upward toward the upper teeth. A large pocket 
was formed and she reported to Dr. Argyle. She 
brings in some material which she recovered 
from her stool believing it to be the material 
she swallowed. I am unable to tell her what it 
is composed of, and suggested if she really wishes 
to know to contact a laboratory. The hole is al-
most healed though there is still some infection. 
At the site of the granulation that I removed 
on the first there is one thread that I removed. 
No other foreign body seen. There was some pus 
surrounding this. She insists there is still further 
foreign body deeper in. To continue hot packs 
and icthyol packs. Advise against probing for 
further material at this time. 
This doesn't sound as though the ulcers were 1 to 
2 inches away from the tonsil area. 
Dr. E. W. Browning saw her condition in 1947. 
Counsel asked him expressly if the ulceration that he 
saw was not removed from the tonsil area (R. 313). 
Here is the testimony of Dr. Browning elicited by coun-
sel for defendant: 
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" 
"'Yell, no, no it wouldn't removed from it 
because, as I say, you haven't too ;much distance 
from here to her, you are getting over the tonsil 
area. 
'' Q. When you say 'over the tonsil area' 
you are pointing to the left 1 
•' A. To the left, to the soft palate covering 
the tonsil fossa. 
'' Q. Now, the tonsil fossa - fossa simply 
means an indentation, doesn't it 1 
''A. That is right. 
''Q. The tonsil, when it is in place, sets in 
that indentation, that is correct, isn't it~ 
''A. That is right.'' 
Dr. ~law, himself, on cross-examination (R. 473) 
stated that the ulcer on the left side as indicated by 
Dr. Dolo"'"i.tz was within half an inch of the anterior 
pillar of the tonsil. 
That evidence doesn't sound like the nearest ulcer 
was 1 to 2 inches from the tonsil fossa. The whole 
mouth, throat, cheeks and gums were infected. The in-
fection spread everywhere, and so did the threads and 
string - particularly after doctors took several biopsies 
and thereby loosened the tissue. They were being pressed 
out toward any opening created by an ulcer of a knife. 
Again we state, it isn't a question of where they 
~arne out. It is a question of where they went in and 
who put them there. 
There was only one man who put an incision in 
1\irs. Fredrickson's throat. That man was Dr. Maw. 
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The jury so found and there was substantial evidence to 
support the finding. 
POINT NO.3 
This point is directed to the alleged error in in-
struction No. 12 with reference to the measure of dam-
ages. The jury was told that they should determine the 
nature, extent and severity of the damages and the 
temporary or permanent character thereof. Counsel 
says that this permitted a recovery for permanent in-
juries and that there is no evidence thereof. 
Our answer to this proposition is (1) that there was 
plenty of evidence of permanent injuries, and (2) that 
the verdict is not excessive and shows no allowance for 
permanent injuries which should warrant a reversal of 
the verdict on that ground. 
Mrs. Fredrickson and her witnesses testified that 
she felt the lumps in her throat immediately following 
the operation; complained of the condition to Dr. Maw, 
Dr. Muirhead, Dr. Boucher, Dr. Argyle, Dr. Browning, 
Dr. Hatch, Dr. Wright and everyone else who would 
listen to her; and finally to Dr. Dolowitz ~ho was re-
sponsible for the biopsies which permitted the gauze to 
come out. She and her witnesses testified that she had 
a sore throat, ulcers and abscesses throughout her throat 
and mouth from the time of her operation to the time 
of trial over four years later. They testified that this 
infection spread to her gums and even appeared in an 
abscess behind the ear on one occasion. The abscesses 
and ulcers came and went, which was natural in view 
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of the fact that every doctor, including Dr. Maw was 
prescribing sulfa and penieillin for control and elimina-
tion of the infection, but which did not remove the 
cause. These constant and continuous dosages of sulfa 
and penicillin were probably the reason for the infection 
failing to sooner bring the gauze to the surface. 
During this time cancer \Yas a natural thought, since 
no one could find out what the source or cause of the 
infection was. It "~as first suggested by Dr. Maw. He 
said it didn't look good. He called in Dr. Hatch. They 
told her they didn't think it was cancer; but nevertheless 
the sores, ulcers and abscesses persisted and spread 
throughout her mouth. She was terrified. Each new 
doctor suspected and suggested the possibility of cancer. 
So did Dr. Browning and Dr. Sears, so they sent her 
to Dr. Dolowitz, who also suspected cancer. Is it any 
wonder that she lost 60 pounds in weight, became sick 
physically and mentally; that the relations between her-
self and her family became strained. They regarded 
her as a mental subject and she was regarded with 
suspicion by her family. Her mouth was foul and of-
fensive, with a bad odor, and diseased. The only evi-
dence of recovery was that her mental and physical 
health had improved. 
She testified that she was getting no relief or sat-
isfaction from Dr. Maw or the Clinic and she naturally 
suspected that her teeth might be the source of the 
trouble. She didn't know that the cause lay imbedded in 
some gauze left there in her throat by the only individ-
ual that ever performed any surgery there. So she 
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went to her dentist, Dr. Wright. He was as helpless 
in his inability to diagnose her difficulty as the rest of 
the doctors. He said he couldn't say for sure whether 
it might be her teeth. It might or might not be. He left 
it up to her to decide, which was his practice in case::; 
of doubt. In leaving the ultimate decision to the patient 
he followed the same practice as Dr. Maw and Dr. 
Tyndale. In the initial diagnosis of plaintiff's condi-
tion they felt that the tonsils might be the cause of her 
arthritis but they left it to her to decide as to whether 
they should be removed. She decided to try it, since it 
was at least a chance for recovery, which was more than 
she had been able to get from the doctors, including 
Dr. Maw and the Clinic. So her front teeth were drawn 
in the faint and futile hope that it would be a solution. 
But that too was ineffectual. The cause was not there. 
It lay deeper in the gauze imbedded in her throat. 
Only after the cause and source of the infection 
was found did she and the doctors find the truth. 
But in the meantime she suffered four years of 
physical, mental, and social distress, including the per-
manent loss of her teeth-all to no purpose-in her 
frantic efforts to find the cause of her trouble. 
Counsel states that this was no evidence of per-
manent injury. We have never heard of teeth coming 
back in at the age of 54; and who are we to say that her 
mental and physical health was not impaired, at least to 
some degree, permanently. For four years she had 
those pieces of gauze in her throat, as collecting and 
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breeding places for bacteria and infection, sending their 
pus into her system and particularly her mouth, gums 
and teeth. 
The evidence as to the loss of her teeth and the 
reason for their withdrawal was not objected to nor 
was there any motion made by counsel for it to be 
stricken as an element of damages. 
If there were any dispute or uncertainty as to 
whether the infection in the mouth was the cause of 
removal of the teeth, counsel himself removed that doubt. 
He asked the question of Mrs. Matthews (R. 250) and 
she said it was because of the sore throat. He asked 
~Ir. Fredrickson why she had her teeth removed (R. 
265). His answer was as follows: ''Because she had 
a bad condition in her throat.'' He asked the same 
question of Dr. Wright (R. 339) and was told that it 
was because she was having trouble and thought the 
teeth might be the cause. 
There are some injuries that are objective in char-
acter and are in the very nature of themselves perma-
nent in character. Loss of a portion of the body and 
disfigurement are of that type. The jury knows they 
are permanent without being told by a doctor. 
Counsel says there was no casual connection shown 
between the malpractice of Dr. Maw and the extraction 
of the teeth. He says the teeth were removed because 
of pyorrhea. Pyorrhea is the result of infection. Dr. 
Wright did not testify that he took the teeth out be-
cause of pyorrhea. He said he took them out because 
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of the diseased condition of her throat in the hope that 
it might help. 
The fact that both Dr. Wright and Mrs. Fredrickson 
may have been in error in this decision is not a matter 
that Dr. Maw can complain about. They had a condi-
tion created by Dr. Maw that none of the doctors had 
been able to diagnose or treat because the existence of 
the foreign body in the throat was not known then. Even 
Dr. Maw had been erroneously treating it for sinus 
infection. 
This is a similar situation to the one considered by 
this court in Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, 73 Utah 535, 275 Pac. 777. 
In that case an injured man went to a doctor who 
erroneously diagnosed his condition as rheumatism and 
recommended he have his teeth out, which he did. It 
subsequently developed that his back was injured and 
that his teeth had nothing to do with his condition . 
.This court held that the loss of the teeth was a com-
pensable injury arising out of the accident for which 
allowance should be made. 
It is, in any event, ,very evident in this case that the 
jury made no substantial allowance for permanent in-
juries. The verdict of $5,000 for over four years of 
physical and mental suffering, humiliation and terror of 
cancer, is certainly not excessive. In fact it was nig-
gardly. She should have had many times that amount. 
Dr. Maw was the first one to put the cancer thought in 
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her mind when he saw an ulcer near the root of her 
tongue and asked for a sample for analysis. She asked 
if he suspected cancer and he said he wouldn't say it 
was but it didn't look good. From then on to the time 
when Dr. Dolowitz uncoYered the hidden gauze cancer 
\vas the first thing that each new doctor suspected, and 
it \Yas the thing that· caused Drs. Browning and Sears 
to send her to Dolowitz. As .Jirs. Fredrickson said, she 
was in a state of mortal terror throughout this entire 
time. Certainly defendant was not prejudiced by this in-
struction because the jury allowed only a very nominal 
amount for such terrible injuries. 
Anything that counsel for plaintiff failed to ask 
in the way of connecting up the loss of the teeth with 
the throat condition was well taken care of by counsel 
for defendant. 
It is not claimed In this case that the verdict is 
excessive, because it obviously is not. No such conten-
tion is made. The error, if any there were, is purely 
:tH technical. Inclusion of the words, ''if any'' in the in-
]lriti struction had the effect of leaving it to the jury to 
determine the nature and extent of the damages as 
shown by the evidence. In other instructions the jury 
:.::r, \Yas told that in considering this question they should 
~· note be guided by sympathy or prejudice and that they 
.;-:& should consider only the evidence introduced in the case. 
jWfi1 
:fll' Where the verdict is not excessive and no error 
taJII~ is assigned upon the ground that the verdict is excessive 
t-·~ under the evidence, the appellate court will not regard 
~1.1:.1~ 
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any such purported error as prejudicial, even though 
it were to be technically so, which in this case it is not. 
The general principle is well stated in 5 C. J. Sec. 
1146 (Sec. 1773b, Appeal and Error), as follows: 
''Erroneous instructions as to the measure 
of damages or the amount of recovery do not 
consitute a ground for reversal where it is ap-
parent that the jury were not influenced or misled 
thereby. Error in instructions will be considered 
harmless where * * * the amount awarded was 
fully justified by the evidence, was not exces-
sive, or was for a smaller amount than the evi-
dence showed or tended to show plaintiff was 
en titled to ; '' 
The authorities uniformly hold that where the ap-
pealing party does not claim or establish that the ver-
dict is excessive that no prejudicial error is shown, even 
though it were to be shown that the instruction is tech-
nically erroneous. 
Barlow v. S. L. & U. R. Co., 57 Utah 312, 194 Pac. 
665. 
The court in its instruction on the measure of 
damages said they might consider the cost of nursing, 
with reference to which there was no evidence. The 
verdict was not excessive and this court refused to 
reverse the case on that technical ground. 
''In instructing on the measure of damages 
the court informed the jury that if the verdict 
was in her favor plaintiff was entitled to such 
damages as would compensate her for all pain, 
suffering, and distress of mind and body, if any 
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which she had endured, or which she would en-
dure in the future as a result of such accident; 
also injuries to her person received by her, if 
any, as a result of such accident; also for any 
pennanent injuries sustained by her, if any, as 
a result thereof, together with all reasonable and 
necessary expense, if any, as shown by the evi-
dence, which she paid or incurred for nursing 
and for medical expense in her attempt to relieve 
herself of the injuries sustained, and also any 
necessary and reasonable sum which she paid in 
removing herself fron1 the place of injury to her 
residence, and from all the facts and circum-
stances as shown by the evidence to award plain-
tiff such an amount as would compensate her for 
all of the injuries and damages by her sustained. 
X o evidence whatever was introduced showing 
the respondent paid anything for nursing or in-
curred any expense therefor. The jury knew 
what the evidence was, knew that nothing had 
been paid for nursing, and that there was no 
evidence of any obligation having been incurred 
therefor. There is no reason for thinking that 
when $2,999 was decided upon as the proper 
amount of respondent's damages an imaginary 
and conjectural amount for nursing was included. 
Technically the court erred in referring to ex-
pense of nursing. Nevertheless, we do not think 
that with the qualifying words 'if any' the in-
struction could possibly be misleading. Berg-
strom v. Mellen, 192 Pac. 679. '' 
This was substantially what was held by this court 
in Olsen v. Kress, 87 Utah 51; 48 Pac. (2d) 430. No one 
testified in that case as to future pain and suffering. 
The trial court included that element in the instruction 
on the question of damages but inserted the words "if 
any'' as a part of the instruction. Counsel for defendant 
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excepted to the instruction on the ground that there 
was no evidence to sustain the same. The trial court, 
however, instructed the jury, as it did in this case, that 
they should be guided solely by the evidence in that re-
gard. This court refused to reverse the case upon that 
ground. 
"On the question of damages the trial court 
instructed the jury that they must first deter-
mine whether plaintiff suffered a miscarriage as 
a proximate result of the accident. If they found 
that she did not so suffer, then they should not 
include any damages for miscarriage or for any 
pain and suffering therefrom, but only such pain 
and suffering and impairment of ability as may 
have resulted independent of the miscarriage, 
and they should then 'only take into considera-
tion such bodily pain and suffering caused by 
such injuries, if any, as you may believe have 
been shown to have resulted proximately from 
the accident or which in the future you believe 
she may sttf/er. If you believe from the evidence 
she may su If er any pain in the future.' Defend-
ant excepts to this instruction for the reason 
that there is no evidence to support future pain 
and suffering unless the miscarriage was caused 
by the accident. However, the evidence shows 
that plaintiff's leg was bruised and she had 
pains all around the lower part of her body and 
back and that these pains have continued. 
Whether these injuries and pains were connected 
solely with the miscarriage and so should not be 
considered if the miscarriage were eliminated 
from consideration was a question of fact which 
the jury should pass upon. The trial court could 
not, nor can this court say, as a matter of law, 
that these injuries and pains were a part of the 
injuries and pains growing out of or insepar-
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ately connected with the nnscarriap;P. Whether 
there would be future pain resulting from the 
injuries other than those incident to the mis-
earriage was like\\~ise a question for the jury. 
\\-e see no error in this instruction." 
Briley v. \Yhite, ·----- Ark. ______ , 193 S.\Y. (2d) 326. 
The court gave a general instruction on the measure 
of damages in a personal injury action similar to the 
one in the case at bar. Defendant assigned error on the 
ground that there \Yas no evidence of permanent injury. 
The appellate court refused to reverse the case upon 
the ground where it \\~as not claimed or shown that the 
verdict was excessive. 
"vVhile attending physicians expressed the 
opinion that the boy would haYe normal use of 
his leg upon complete healing, which admittedly 
had not taken place at the time of the trial, there 
was substantial testimony from which the jury 
might have inferred that his injury was more 
than a temporary one. Furthermore, it cannot 
be said with certainty that when the shock of 
such an injury, the slowness of the healing pro-
cess, the pain and suffering undergone by the 
appellee, and his loss of a year's school work are 
considered the jury's verdict was grossly exces-
sive, even if no permanent damage to the leg was 
shown. In this view of the matter, the instruc-
tion complained of, even though objectionable, 
was not prejudicial. Dallas & Gulf R. Co. v. 
Steel, 108 Ark. 14, 156 S.W. 182, Ann. Cas. 
1915B 198. 
See also the following authorities to the same effect: 
Hecker v. Union Cab Co., 134 Ore. 385, 293 Pac. 726. 
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Ball v. Gessner, 185 Minn. 105, 240 N.W. 100. 
Romann v. Bender, 190 Minn. 419, 252 N.W. 80. 
Snyder v. Western Union, (Mo. App.) 277 S.W. 362. 
J acklich v. Starks, 338 Ill. A.pp. 433, 87 N.E. 2d 
802. 
It is a jury question as to whether injuries involv-
ing mental and physical distress and illness resulting in 
great loss of weight is or is not of a permanent nature. 
This in addition to the loss of teeth fully justified the 
trial court in giving instruction No. 12 in leaving to 
the jury to determine the question and include an allow-
ance therefor if it so found. There was no prejudicial 
error, particularly where no claim is made that the 
verdict is excessive, which it obviously is not. 
POINTS 4 AND 5 
These points have to do with the propriety of the 
trial court's ruling on the right of defendant, upon 
cross-examination of Dr. Dolowitz, to go into matters 
not covered by the direct examination, namely, his pro-
fessional opinion as to whether gauze left in the tonsil 
area could travel to the place of ulceration from which 
gauze, threads, or strings were removed by him and by 
Mrs. Fredrickson as told to him by Mrs. Fredrickson. 
Objections to the questions were made by plaintiff 
upon the ground that it was not proper cross-examina-
tion as the subject matter had not been covered in the 
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I, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
direct examination. The trial court sustained the ob-
jection and thereafter defendants called Dr. Dolowitz 
as their witness and the subject matter was covered by 
defendants by the same witness as a part of defendants' 
case. 
To these points plaintiff says: 
(a) The trial court was right in its rulings; and 
(b) If there was any error, which plaintiff denies, 
it was not prejudicial. 
A reading of the direct examination of Dr. Dolo-
witz as plaintiff's witness shows that he was asked only 
to state the facts as he found them and what he saw and 
did. He was nowhere asked for his professional opinion 
as to the source of the foreign substances, whether they 
arrived at the point of ulceration from the tonsil area 
or any other place by migration or whether they wer~ 
originally deposited there by someone. 
It will be noted that the discussion of these points 
is presented by appellant without citation of authority. 
Counsel either found no authorities sustaining their 
position or found them adverse to their contention. The 
principle involved is not new. The cross-examination 
may not go beyond the scope of the subject matter 
covered by the direct examination. Any rna tters and 
things tending to vary, contradict, modify or explain 
the direct examination may be covered by the cross-
examination. 
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Dr. Dolowitz was called as any other witness to 
testify as to facts. The fact that his relationship to 
plaintiff was shown as physician and patient was shown 
not for the purpose of qualifying him as an expert to 
express an opinion but to show the circumstances under 
which he learned and observed the facts to which he 
was testifying. 
The applicable rule of law is well stated in 58 Am. 
Juris. 474 (Witnesses Sec. 844) as follows: 
''In the event an expert witness has testified 
to facts observed by him, and not to his opinion 
based thereon, he caJl'l!not be cross-examined as to 
his professional opinion, nor will questions be 
allowed to be put to him which tend merely to 
discredit him, and in no way affect the value 
of his testimony.'' 
The cited authority is Enos v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. 
Co., (S. D.) 57 N.W. 919. The case is in point and sus-
tained the announced principle. 
The extent and character of cross-examination to 
be permitted under the announced limitation is in the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and its rulings will 
not be a ground of reversal unless abuse of discretion 
is shown. 
Malia v. Seeley, 89 Utah 262, 57 Pac. (2d) 357. 
Anderson v. S. L. & 0. Ry., 35 Utah 509, 101 Pac. 
579. 
The general principle that the cross-examination 
may not go beyond the scope of the direct examination 
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is announced and ap-plied by this court in the following 
cases: 
Tuft Y. Brotherson, 106 Utah 499, 150 Pac. (2d) 384. 
State v. :Murphy, 92 Utah 382, 68 Pac. (2d) 188. 
State v. Bruno, 97 Utah 33, 92 Pac. (2d) 1103. 
Jensen v. Kress, 87 Utah 434, 49 Pac. (2d) 958. 
Dr. Dolowitz subsequently appeared as an expert 
witness for defendants and expressed his opinions on 
the same subject matter attempted to be covered on 
cross-examination. Defendant was not prejudiced If 
there were any error, which we deny, it was harmless 
and was cured by the subsequent evidence of Dr. Dolo-
witz. 
Malia v. Seeley, 89 Utah 262, 57 Pac. (2d) 357. 
In re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 Pac. (2d) 602. 
Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Proctor, 58 
Idaho 578, 76 Pac. (2d) 438. 
Radermacher v. Radermacher, 59 Idaho 716, 87 
Pac. (2d) 461. 
Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 Utah 21, 290 
Pac. 970. 
Thompson v. Bown Livestock Co., 74 Utah 1, 276 
Pac. 651. 
Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 Pac. (2d) 1073. 
~ Apparently these points were thrown in by appel-
~ lants in a wild hope that this court had forgotten funda-
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mental principles of law; or perhaps it was to give this 
court a little extra work; or again it may have been a 
desperate chance in a hopeless case in the thought that 
someone might, notwithstanding the law, "hang their 
hat on it" to give them a new trial. 
It seems to have been "thrown m for what it is 
worth'', which is nothing. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff, Mrs. Fredrickson, was the victim of 
malpractice. It was uncontradicted that there were two 
pieces of gauze sponge-one on either side-left in her 
throat. They exuded through incisions made by Dr. 
Dolowitz in removing some large ulcers in taking deep 
biopsies to determine if she had cancer. These sponges 
were loose weave surgical gauze, seen and identified as 
such by several witnesses. For four years, commencing 
immediately following the tonsil operation performed 
by Dr. Maw, she had felt a lump in her throat and had 
suffered from ulcers, abscesses and sores in her mouth 
and throat. Counsel for defendant, in his address to 
the jury, said that whoever left them there .was guilty 
of criminal negligence. We hesitate to use such strong 
language, but it certainly was grossly careless. Shortly 
after the operation Dr. Maw, himself, planted the 
thought of cancer. For four years she lived in terror 
of that possibility, notwithstanding opinions by Cowan 
& Nielson and Dr. Hatch that it was not. E~ach new 
doctor or dentist from whom she sought relief from her 
diseased and distressful condition, replanted the thought 
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of cancer. She lost 60 pounds in weight, and became, 
as her husband and friends described her, a nervous 
wreck, worrying about the possibility of cancer. She 
even contemplated suicide rather than cancer. They 
regarded her as mentally unbalanced because of her 
insistence that there was a lump in her throat and that 
she had not recovered from the effects of the tonsil 
operation. Her throat was sore, infected and offensive. 
Her mouth had a foul odor and it impaired her relations 
with her husband, her family and her grandchildren. In 
spite of her infected mouth and throat they thought it 
was all imagination on her part and that there was 
some other cause for her distress. Finally Dr. Brown-
ing and Dr. Sears, suspecting cancer, referred her to 
Dr. Dolowitz who, taking deep biopsies, uncovered the 
two gauze sponges and made it possible for them to 
escape from their imbedded and concealed recesses. 
Who did that terrible and careless thing~ The jury 
said Dr. Maw did it. He was the only one who performed 
surgery in her throat before or since. He made an in-
cision on each side, removed a tonsil on each side, used 
gauze sponges and catgut sutures on each side, and a 
piece of gauze came out on each side. The City Chemist 
identified the exuded foreign material as gauze and 
catgut after Dr. Maw said it was undigested food; and 
the gauze sponges were the cause of her injury and 
distress. The mass of threads, cotton and strings were 
~~ 
'.(; introduced in evidence, excepting the one from the left 
~· side which was used by the City Chemist for analysis. 
Dr. Maw saw it before it was analyzed and said it was f~ 
undigested food. 
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By the evidence of plaintiff all individuals other 
than Dr. Maw were excluded from possible or probable 
responsibility. None of them performed any surgery 
in her mouth or throat where gauze sponges or catgut 
suturing were used. Their efforts were primarily sub-
sequent to the malpractice in an effort to diagnose her 
condition and find a remedy. To every one of them she 
told her story-always the same-that she had had a 
tonsil operation, had a lump in her throat immediately 
following it and an ulcerated, abscessed and diseased 
condition in her throat and mouth continuously since 
the operation. They prescribed sulfa, penicillin and re-
moval of her remaining front teeth as the remedy. It 
finally remained for Dr. Dolowitz to find the gauze 
sponges, which gave the answer. 
Dr. Maw had a fair trial. The evidence was over-
whelmingly against him. He shifted his position from 
undigested food to the dentists but there was no sub-
stantial evidence to back him up. The witnesses closed 
all of those avenues of escape for the responsibility for 
this oversight or forgetfulness or whatever it was on 
the doctor's part that resulted in this malpractice. 
The verdict was not excessive. It should have been 
much larger. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH and ELTON, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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